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THE RIGHT TO KEEP AND CARRY ARMS 
IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW: 





On the final day of its 2008 term, a sharply divided United States Supreme 
Court issued a five to four decision in District of Columbia v. Heller.1 Reversing 
almost seventy years of settled precedent that linked the meaning of the “right of 
the people to keep and bear arms” with the preservation of a “well-regulated 
militia,”2 Heller interpreted the Second Amendment as an individual right to 
possess a weapon for self-defense outside of the context of service in a well-
regulated militia.3 Justice Scalia’s majority opinion surveyed a broad range of 
historical materials,4 but it approached the past as if it were static, when in fact 
Anglo-American history  in this period was not only dynamic, but many areas of 
law underwent profound transformation.5 Prior to Heller, there had been 
relatively little scholarship on the scope of this pre-existing right. Most of the 
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1. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
2.  Reva B. Siegel, Dead or Alive: Originalism as Popular Constitutionalism in Heller, 122 HARV.
L. REV. 191 (2008); Cass Sunstein, Second Amendment Minimalism: Heller as Griswold, 122 HARV. L. 
REV. 246 (2008).
3.  Heller, 554 U.S. at 635.
4.  See id. at 582–615 (referring to sources from the 1700s to post–Civil War legislation).
5. The Court had last dealt with the Second Amendment in United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174
(1939), in which it ruled that because shotguns with barrels less than eighteen inches in length had no 
relationship to a well-regulated militia, the Second Amendment did not guarantee a right to keep and 
bear such firearms. For examples of scholarly reactions to Heller, see THE SECOND AMENDMENT ON 
TRIAL: CRITICAL ESSAYS ON DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA V. HELLER (Saul Cornell & Nathan Kozuskanich 
eds., 2013) (providing a series of academic responses to the decision). On the transformation of Anglo-
American law in this period, see JACK P. GREENE,  THE CONSTITUTIONAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN 
REVOLUTION (2011). 
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legal scholarship on the Second Amendment prior to Heller simply ignored the 
problem of historical change entirely.6 Yet, during the interval between 1688 and 
the next century and a half, Anglo-American law underwent profound 
transformation, which had far reaching consequences for law, including the 
meaning of the right to keep and bear arms.7 Recognizing the importance of 
change over time, the essence of any truly historical account, is not simply 
important to correct the historical record, Heller’s holding makes history central 
to the future of Second Amendment jurisprudence. “Although we do not 
undertake an exhaustive historical analysis today of the full scope of the Second 
Amendment,” the majority wrote “nothing in our opinion should be taken to cast 
doubt on longstanding prohibitions.”8 Thus, according to Heller, establishing a 
legitimate historical pedigree for gun regulation has become one key to 
determining if a restriction is presumptively lawful under Heller’s framework. 
This article analyzes a neglected area of Second Amendment scholarship: the role 
of common law restrictions on the scope of keeping and bearing arms in the 
period between the Glorious Revolution (1688) and the Early American 
Republic (1800–1835). 
II 
HELLER’S HISTORICAL PARADOX 
Although Heller posited a static pre-existing English right that had become 
fixed by the time of the Glorious Revolution, the half century following the 
Glorious Revolution witnessed a number of important changes in the way the law 
addressed arms. At the dawn of the eighteenth century the scope of the right to 
have arms and the meaning of self-defense under English law was quite narrow. 
Indeed, it would be more accurate to describe the right of self-defense as an 
exemption from prosecution, not a positive rights claim in the modern sense.9  
The English Declaration of Rights affirmed the right of Protestants to have arms 
suitable to their condition, as the law allowed, but it did not sanction the use of 
deadly force in most circumstances and did not even imply a right to own a gun 
in most situations.10 What the law did do was acknowledge that one could not be 
prosecuted for homicide in self-defense.  To effectuate this claim, one might use 
whatever weapons one was legally entitled to possess. The right to keep and use 
arms was limited by class and religion and subject to extensive Parliamentary 
 
 6.  See Sanford Levinson, United States: Assessing Heller, 7 INT’L J. CONST. L. 316 (2009) at 326; 
Sunstein, supra note 2. 
 7.  Heller, 554 U.S. 570. Heller relied on the work of English historian Joyce Lee Malcolm, JOYCE 
LEE MALCOLM, TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS: THE ORIGINS OF AN ANGLO-AMERICAN RIGHT (1996). 
For critiques of Malcolm’s history, see LOIS SCHWOERER, GUN CULTURE IN EARLY MODERN 
ENGLAND 169 (2016); Patrick J. Charles, The Faces of the Second Amendment Outside the Home, Take 
Two: How We Got Here and Why it Matters, 64 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 373 (2016). 
 8.  Heller, 554 U.S. at 592, 626. 
 9.  Daryl A. H. Miller, Self-Defense, Defense of Others, and the State, 80 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., 
no. 2, 2017, at 89–90.  
 10.  Infra Part III. 
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regulation. Over the course of the next half century, English courts used common 
law methods of legal interpretation and expanded the scope of this right, 
eventually recognizing that ownership of a gun in the home for reasons of self-
defense was legal. Although Heller mistakenly attributed this legal proposition 
to the English Declaration of Rights of 1688,11 the right of self-defense had 
evolved under common law in the half century following the Glorious 
Revolution. 
The scope of the right to carry arms in public, by contrast, remained narrowly 
defined and limited to a range of specific situations defined by common law and 
statute. In particular, the right to travel armed for reasons of self-defense was 
always balanced against the need to preserve the King’s Peace. The preservation 
of the peace trumped the right to have arms in most circumstances.12 
The American Revolution may have republicanized this legal tradition, but it 
did not break with it immediately in a number of key areas. Even after the 
adoption of new state constitutions, some of which affirmed the right to keep and 
bear arms, the scope of the right was still shaped by the common law tradition, 
including the necessity of preserving the peace. In the decades after the American 
Revolution, what had been a single English common law tradition splintered, 
producing different regional regulatory regimes. By the middle of the antebellum 
era in parts of the slave South a permissive regime regarding the open carry of 
arms gained traction. In other parts of the South, civic republican ideas continued 
to constrain the scope of the right. Finally, starting in New England and spreading 
across the nation a more restrictive view of public carry evolved.   
The primary bodies of sources consulted for this study are the popular legal 
guidebooks written for justices of the peace that proliferated in the 150 years 
following the Glorious Revolution.13 These texts provide some of the best 
accounts of popular understandings of Anglo-American legal principles in this 
period.14 Written for justices of the peace, constables, and coroners, these guides 
were addressed to an audience with no formal legal training.15 Their authors 
summarized the common understanding of the law and often included boilerplate 
examples of common legal writs and other useful documents.16 In many parts of 
the Anglo-American world, including rural England and the settler societies of 
the Atlantic world, there were relatively few persons formally trained in the law, 
so it is hardly surprising that this genre of legal texts became extremely popular.17 
 
 11.  Heller, 554 U.S. at 593. 
 12.  Infra Part VI. 
 13.  See Larry M. Boyer, The Justice of the Peace in England and America from 1506 to 1776: A 
Bibliographic History, 34 Q.J. LIBR. CONG. 315 (1977) (discussing the importance of popular guide books 
in England and America). 
 14.  Id.  
 15.  Id. 
 16.  Id. 
 17.  See John A. Conley, Doing it by the Book: Justice of the Peace Manuals and English Law in 
Eighteenth Century America, 6 J. LEGAL HIST. 257 (1985). For an illustration of how these texts shaped 
legal culture in the colonies, see Alfred Brophy, “For the Preservation of the King’s Peace and Justice”: 
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The popularity of these texts also reflects the important role that justices of the 
peace played in keeping the peace in Anglo-American communities on both sides 
of the Atlantic. Many of these texts went through multiple editions over the 
course of the next century and a half, making them an excellent source for 
tracking the changing meaning of legal concepts over time.18 The proliferation of 
these books did not cease after the American Revolution. Indeed, the need for 
them multiplied because each state in the new American Republic had to grapple 
with its own unique relationship to the evolution of the common law. By the 
middle of the antebellum era, the common English legal heritage had become 
differentiated into distinctive regional legal cultures.19 Although popular legal 
guidebooks have occasionally been cited in recent Second Amendment 
scholarship, the use of these texts has been highly selective and impressionistic.20 
Looking at these sources in a more systematic fashion reveals  a process of  
change far more complex than previous accounts have suggested.21 
An understanding of the evolving nature of the right to keep and carry arms 
is not only essential to implementing Heller’s historical framework, but it may 
also offer insight into how to resolve some of the contradictions and 
jurisprudential problems created by the opinion.22 In his dissent, Justice Breyer 
suggested a balancing model that Justice Scalia dismissed as incompatible with 
the original understanding of the right to keep and bear arms. But it turns out 
that Breyer and Scalia’s divergent approaches may not have been legally 
incompatible in the Founding era.23 Something analogous to a balancing exercise 
was fundamental to the way Anglo-American law dealt with arms throughout 
this period.24 The liberty interest associated with the right to arms was always 
balanced against the concept of the peace.25 If an individual’s exercise of this right 
threatened the peace, individuals could be disarmed, imprisoned, and forced to 
provide a peace bond.26 The American Revolution republicanized the concept of 
the King’s Peace by transmuting it into the people’s peace, but the Revolution 
 
Community and English Law in Sussex County, Pennsylvania, 1682–1696, 40 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 167 
(1996). 
 18.  See infra Parts IV–VII. 
 19.  Infra Part IX. 
 20.  Eugene Volokh, The First and Second Amendments, 109 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 97, 101 
(2009). See also David Kopel, The First Century of Right to Arms Litigation, 14 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 
(2016) (using justice of the peace manuals in an impressionistic manner and reading them 
anachronistically by failing to recognize that early modern English criminal law had no modern mens rea 
requirement for establishing criminal intent); cf. GUYORA BINDER, CRIMINAL LAW 139–42 (2016). 
 21.  See infra Bibliography (listing the texts consulted for this essay).  
 22.  Allen Rostron, Justice Breyer’s Triumph in the Third Battle over the Second Amendment, 80 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 703 (2012) (explaining that lower courts have been applying a form of intermediate 
scrutiny that entails some aspects of balancing). 
 23.  See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 689–90 (2008) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (calling 
for use of a balancing test and arguing that “there simply is no untouchable constitutional right to keep 
loaded handguns in the house in crime-ridden urban areas.”). 
 24.  Infra Part VI. 
 25.  Infra Part VI.  
 26.  Infra Part VI. 
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did not repudiate the centrality of the balancing process used to determine if 
armed travel violated the peace.27 
III 
ARMS SUITABLE TO THEIR CONDITION AND AS ALLOWED BY LAW 
The English Declaration of Rights (1688) affirmed: “[t]hat the subjects which 
are Protestants may have arms for their defence suitable to their conditions and 
as allowed by law.”28 Although Blackstone described this as the fifth auxiliary 
right, a protection of English liberty, his discussion underscores the limited 
nature of this claim, which he described as “a public allowance, under due 
restrictions, of the natural right of resistance and self-preservation, when the 
sanctions of society and laws are found insufficient to restrain the violence of 
oppression.”29 Blackstone’s elaboration of the right makes it clear that its 
inclusion in the Declaration of Rights did not limit Parliament’s authority over 
arms in any way.30 In fact, the formulation of the right reasserted Parliament’s 
plenary power to legislate on matters pertaining to arms and, when necessary, 
restrict this right in a manner consistent with its nearly unlimited powers to 
protect the peace and promote public safety.31 Perhaps the best illustration of 
how the scope of this right was understood in the period immediately after the 
Glorious Revolution is Parliament’s debate over a revision to the Game Laws in 
1692.  The game laws, which regulated hunting, had imposed stiff penalties on the 
possession of guns for those who failed to meet the property requirements 
imposed by the acts. The House of Commons considered and rejected by a two 
to one majority a rider to the act that would have allowed “any Protestant to keep 
a Musquet in his House, notwithstanding this or any other act.”32 The reaction of 
the House of Lords was no less negative, it quashed the idea as too radical 
because it tended to “arm the mob.”33 
 
 27.  See LAURA F. EDWARDS, THE PEOPLE AND THEIR PEACE: LEGAL CULTURE AND THE 
TRANSFORMATION OF INEQUALITY IN THE POST-REVOLUTIONARY SOUTH (2009) (examining the 
evolution of post-Revolution judicial systems and their focus on maintaining peace).  
 28.  1 W. & M. 2, ch. 2 (1689). 
 29.  1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *139. Blackstone describes such rights as follows: 
“But in vain would these rights be declared, ascertained, and protected by the dead letter of the laws, if 
the constitution had provided no other method to secure their actual enjoyment. It has therefore 
established certain other auxiliary subordinate rights of the subject, which serve principally as barriers to 
protect and maintain inviolate the three great and primary rights, of personal security, personal liberty, 
and private property.”  
 30.  Id. 
 31.  On Parliamentary power in this period, see DAVID J. LIEBERMAN, THE PROVINCE OF 
LEGISLATION DETERMINED (1989). 
 32.  10 H.C. JOUR., 1688-93, at 823–24 (1802); BRITISH HISTORY ONLINE, http://www.british-
history.ac.uk/commons-jrnl/vol10/pp823-824 [https://perma.cc/TPF9-3X97] (last accessed Oct. 17, 2016). 
 33.  See Patrick J. Charles, “Arms for Their Defence”?: An Historical, Legal and Textual Analysis of 
the English Right to Have Arms and Whether the Second Amendment Should Be Incorporated in 
McDonald v. City of Chicago, 57 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 351, 403 (2009) (noting the lack of a pre-existing 
right to “having arms”); Lois G. Schwoerer, To Hold and Bear Arms: The English Perspective, 76 CHI. 
KENT L. REV. 27, 35 (2000) (discussing the failed effort to amend the game laws to allow subjects to keep 
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The game laws not only limited who might keep arms, they also placed limits 
on who could travel armed and in what manner.34 As the game laws make clear, 
the pre-existing English Right embodied in the Declaration of Rights did not 
encompass a claim to possess guns if one failed to meet the property requirements 
imposed by the game acts.35 Instead, the Declaration of Rights assumed that the 
scope of the right of self-defense was extremely narrow, amounting to little more 
than an exemption from prosecution should one need to defend oneself against 
a deadly assault.36 Thus, one might use any weapon legally possessed but not 
demand any particular weapon to exercise this right.37 
One of the most prolific popularizers of the law in the period after the 
Glorious Revolution was Giles Jacob, who authored a popular legal dictionary 
and several general guides to the law.38 Jacob helped expand popular legal writing 
as a genre. He summarized the general rule for self-defense concisely: “there 
must be an unavoidable Necessity for Self-preservation to making killing 
justifiable.”39 Individuals were obliged to retreat, not stand their ground.40 
William Blackstone endorsed this view later in the century, when he wrote: 
[T]his right of preventive defence, but in sudden and violent cases; when certain and 
immediate suffering would be the consequence of waiting for the assistance of the law. 
Wherefore, to excuse homicide by the plea of self-defence, it must appear that the slayer 
had no other possible means of escaping from his assailant.41 
William Hawkins, another influential English legal commentator in the first 
half of the eighteenth-century, underscored the way in which the exercise of this 






 34.  For examples of the various game acts, THE GAME LAW: OR, A COLLECTION OF THE LAWS 
AND STATUTES MADE FOR THE PRESERVATION OF THE GAME OF THIS KINGDOM 13, 36 (5th ed. 1714). 
 35.  See WILLIAM NELSON, THE LAWS OF ENGLAND CONCERNING THE GAME OF HUNTING, 
HAWKING, FISHING, AND FOWLING, 167–77 (2d ed. 1727),  
 36.  For an elaboration of this point, see Miller, supra note 9, at 89–90.  
 37.  Although the maxim that “when the law doth give anything to any man, it giveth also, impliedly, 
whatsoever is necessary for the taking and enjoying of the same” might seem to apply to specific arms, 
this rule must be read against the Declaration of Rights’ affirmation that subjects were only entitled to 
“arms suitable to their condition” and the game laws property requirements for owning firearms. For this 
and other relevant maxims, see THE GROUNDS AND RUDIMENTS OF LAW AND EQUITY 321 (1749).  
 38.  On its role in expanding the genre of popular legal writing, see Julia Rudolph, That “Blunderbuss 
of Law”: Giles Jacob, Abridgement, and Print Culture, 37 STUD. EIGHTEENTH CENTURY CULTURE 197 
(2008). 
 39.  On the limited scope of self-defense under English law at this moment in history, see GILES 
JACOB, THE LAWS OF APPEALS AND MURDER 46 (1719). See also MATHEW HALE, PLEAS TO THE 
CROWN (1707); WILLIAM HAWKINS, A TREATISE OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN (1716). 
 40.  4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *184. See also GILES JACOB, A LAW GRAMMAR; 
OR RUDIMENTS OF THE LAW: COMPILED FROM THE GROUNDS, PRINCIPLES, MAXIMS, TERMS, WORDS 
OF ART, RULES, AND MOOT-POINTS OF OUR LAW 22 (1744) (explaining that deadly force was justified 
in the case of sudden attach where there was no opportunity to retreat). 
 41.  4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 40, at *184.  
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In his influential treatise, Pleas to the Crown, he wrote: 
[I]n all these Cases, there ought to be a Distinction between an Assault in the Highway 
and an Assault in a Town; for in the first Case it is said, That the Person assaulted may 
justify killing the other without giving back at all: But that in the second Case, he ought 
to retreat as far as he can without apparently hazarding his Life, in respect of the 
Probability of getting Assistance.42 
Modern rights claims are typically not context dependent, even if they may 
be subject to reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions.43 Self-defense 
under English common law was almost the opposite of a modern rights claim.  
The right could only be claimed under specific circumstances that were 
determined by the time, place, and manner of the threat.44 The burden of proof 
was on the subject, not the crown, to show that deadly force had been justified 
because retreat and the opportunity to seek assistance were impossible. Violent 
confrontation did not justify the use of deadly force. Subjects were required to 
retreat rather than stand their ground in most circumstances45 
A different set of rules applied to confrontations in the home where there was 
no duty to retreat. It was a well-established maxim under common law that there 
was no duty to retreat from an attack in the home.46 Yet, even this cherished 
principle of common law, the castle doctrine, was bounded and context sensitive. 
Deadly force was not justified in every case of trespass; a mere trespass at night 
might justify deadly force while a similar act in the day would not.47 
One of the most important changes in English law regarding self-defense was 
a slow and gradual recognition that keeping a gun in the home enjoyed some 
measure of legal protection.48 At the end of the seventeenth century there was no 
right to own firearms under English law. The English Declaration of Rights 
acknowledged that access to firearms could be limited by class and religion. The 
various game acts specified with great precision the amount of property required 
to make owning a firearm legal. Gradually, over the course of the eighteenth 
century, English courts began reinterpreting the game laws using common law 
methods of interpretation, eventually concluding that that the mere presence of 
 
 42.  HAWKINS, supra note 39, at 73.  
 43.  For a discussion of time, place, and manner restrictions in the context of modern First 
Amendment doctrine, see Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941). 
 44.  JACOB, supra note 40, at 21–22. 
 45.  HAWKINS, supra note 39, at 73. 
 46.  JACOB, supra note 39, at 46–48.  
 47.  Id.  
 48.  See Rex v. Gardner, 93 Eng. Rep. 1056 (K.B. 1739) (holding that simply possessing a gun is 
permissible because “a gun is necessary for defence of a house, or for a farmer to shoot crows”); Wingfield 
v. Stratford, 96 Eng. Rep. 787 (K.B. 1752) (reinterpreting the game laws, the King’s Bench concluded 
that they were not supposed “to disarm all the people of England”). Joyce Lee Malcolm erroneously 
accepts the court’s historical conclusion at face value and reads the new conception of gun rights 
backwards in time to 1688. See MALCOLM, supra note 7. The court’s conclusion is better interpreted as 
an example of a style of common law legal reasoning that historian John Reid dubs forensic history. See 
John Phillip Reid, Law and History, 27 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 193 (1993). English lawyers essentially 
constructed a new version of the past to justify legal change, preserving the appearance that the law was 
fixed. 
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a gun in a home was no longer per se evidence of an attempt to illegally take 
game.49 Further, courts finally acknowledged that there might be other legitimate 
and legal uses for guns, most notably pest control and home defense.50 Although 
English courts articulated this legal doctrine by the end of the 1730s, this new, 
more robust understanding of the law took some time to permeate English legal 
culture. Popular guides to the law did not start to reflect the new understanding 
until the 1750s.51 
IV 
NO MAN, GREAT OR SMALL, SHALL GO OR RIDE ARMED: THE STATUTE OF 
NORTHAMPTON 
One of the most significant constraints on armed travel was the Statute of 
Northampton (1328) enacted during the reign of Edward III. The act declared 
that all individuals, regardless of their station, were bound to “bring no force in 
affray of the peace, nor to go nor ride armed by night nor by day.”52 The statute 
also provided a means of enforcement. Agents of the King could arrest violators 
who would be obliged “to forfeit their armour to the King, and their bodies to 
prison at the King’s pleasure.” The language of the Statute of Northampton was 
often included, or paraphrased in the texts of the various Royal Peace 
Commissions issued by Edward III enjoining localities to keep the peace of the 
realm. In 1361 Parliament created the office of justice of the peace, and endowed 
it with broad powers to enforce law and order. 53 
The legal authority to enforce the Statute of Northampton became one of the 
many powers associated with the office of the justice of the peace. Writing over 
two hundred years after the office of the justice of the peace was created, the 
influential Elizabethan lawyer William Lambarde underscored this point in his 
popular legal text Eirenarcha. Lambarde’s gloss on the Statute of Northampton 
was also copied nearly verbatim into another legal text he authored, The Duties 
of Constables: “[I]f any person whatsoever shall be so bold, as to go, or ride 
armed, by night, or by day, in Faires, Markets, or any other places: then any 
Constable, or any other of the saide Officers, may take such Armour from him, 
 
 49.  Bernadette Meyler, Towards a Common Law Originalism, 59 STAN. L. REV. 551 (2006). 
 50.  See Rex, 93 Eng. Rep. at 1056. 
 51.  The evidence also suggests that changes in case law did not immediately translate into new 
treatments in the standard guides to the law. See RICHARD BURN, THE JUSTICE OF THE PEACE, AND 
PARISH OFFICER 468 (2d ed. 1756) (demonstrating that there was a lag time between the cases and their 
incorporation in popular legal guidebooks). 
 52.  Statute of Northampton, 2 Edw. 3, c. 3 (1328) (Eng.); 20 Rich. 2, c. 1 (1396-97) (Eng.).  
 53.  On the historical origins of the Statute of Northampton, see A. MUSSON & W. M. ORMROD, THE 
EVOLUTION OF ENGLISH JUSTICE: LAW, POLITICS AND SOCIETY IN THE FOURTEENTH CENTURY 
(1998) and Anthony Verduyn, The Politics of Law and Order during the Early Years of Edward III, 108 
ENG. HIST. REV. 842 (1993). On the role of justices of the peace in the maintenance of law in order in 
early modern England, see STEVE HINDLE, THE STATE AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN EARLY MODERN 
ENGLAND, 1550–1640 66–93 (2000) and A.J. Musson, Sub-Keepers and Constables: The Role of Local 
Officials in Keeping the Peace in Fourteenth-Century England, 117 ENG. HIST. REV. 1 (2002).  
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for the Queenes use, & may also commit him to the Gaole.”54 The text of the 
Statute of Northampton and glosses on its main provisions were frequently 
reprinted in both elite and popular legal guides over the next century.55 Another 
measure of its pervasiveness may be found in the writings of Whig theorist James 
Tyrell, who cited it in his influential defense of the Glorious Revolution 
Bibliotheca Politica.56 A conservative Whig, Tyrell sought to defend the Glorious 
Revolution, but also aimed to blunt the most radical and potentially destabilizing 
arguments about the right of revolution being bandied about in public debate.57 
Although Tyrrell conceded that there was a limited right “to take up Arms” in 
response to “illegal Violence,” he was emphatic that this did not sanction 
traveling armed under normal circumstances.58 To substantiate this claim, Tyrell 
cited the Statute of Northampton, reading it as imposing a broad general 
prohibition on armed travel. Thus, Tyrell wrote it was a crime “so much as to ride 
or go arm’d as may appear in the Statute of Northampton.”59 
The City of London enacted its own local ordinance limiting armed travel that 
drew on the language of the Statute of Northampton. London’s prohibition was 
equally sweeping: “no one, of whatever condition he be, go armed in the said city 
or in the suburbs, or carry arms by day or night.”60 A decade after the adoption 
of the English Declaration, the force of this restriction was evidenced by a 
complaint published in a London paper that reported “that several Persons not 
Qualified by the Laws of this Realm, to carry Arms, have nevertheless in 
contempt and Violation of the Law, taken on them to Ride and Go Armed.”61 
Legal commentators, both in popular justice of the peace manuals and 
learned treatises, treated the Statute of Northampton as a foundational principle 
for enforcing the peace.62 Writing at the close of the eighteenth century, the 
 
 54.  WILLIAM LAMBARDE, THE DUTIES OF CONSTABLES, BORSHOLDERS, TYTHINGMEN, AND 
SUCH OTHER LOW AND LAY MINISTERS OF THE PEACE 6–14 (1602). On Lambarde’s influence, see 
Wilfrid Prest, William Lambarde, Elizabethan Law Reform, and Early Stuart Politics, 34 J. BRIT. STUD. 
464 (1995). Lambarde copied this passage verbatim into THE DUTIES OF CONSTABLES (1602). Gun rights 
scholar Joyce Lee Malcolm erroneously claims that the statute fell into desuetude, see MALCOLM, supra 
note 7. For arguments showing that this was not the case, see Charles, supra note 7, at 393.  
 55.  See MALCOLM, supra note 7, at 104. 
 56.  JAMES TYRELL, BIBLIOTHECA POLITICA: OR AN ENQUIRY INTO THE ANCIENT 
CONSTITUTION OF THE ENGLISH GOVERNMENT BOTH IN RESPECT TO THE JUST EXTENT OF REGAL 
POWER, AND THE RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES OF THE SUBJECT 639 (1694).  
 57.  According to historian Martyn Thompson, Tyrell played a key role in popularizing Locke’s ideas 
in the 1690s. Martyn Thompson, The Reception of Locke’s Two Treatises of Government 1690–1705, 24 
POL. STUD. 184 (1976). For a brief but lucid discussion of Tyrell’s relevance to early Whig political theory, 
see Tim Harris, James II, the Glorious Revolution, and the Destiny of Britain, 51 HIST. J. 763, 768 (2008). 
 58.  See TYRELL, supra note 56, at 639. 
 59.  Id. 
 60.  JOHN CARPENTER & RICHARD WHITINGTON, LIBER ALBUS: THE WHITE BOOK OF THE CITY 
OF LONDON 335 (Henry Thomas Riley trans., 1862). 
 61.  THE POST BOY (London), Dec. 21, 1699, at 1; see also SAMUEL BLACKERBY, THE JUSTICE OF 
PEACE HIS COMPANION 4 (1715). 
 62.  For a sample of texts making this argument, see JACOB, supra note 40, at 426 (citing Hawkins 
and Blackstone for authority on this proposition and treating the prohibition on traveling armed 
embodied in the Statute of Northampton separately from the related common law crime of affray); 
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author of The Grammar of English Law, echoed this account by confidently 
asserting that “no man, great or small, shall go or ride armed, by night or by day, 
with dangerous or unusual weapons, terrifying the good people of the land.”63 
J.P. Gent’s A New Guide for Constables (1705) averred that the Statute of 
Northampton prohibited riding or going “armed offensively” before the “King’s 
Justices” or in “Fairs or Markets.”64 Additionally, Joseph Keble, author of 
another popular guide to the law, warned that if anyone was so “bold as to go or 
ride Armed, by night or day, in Fairs, Markets, or any other places,” constables 
could disarm him and “commit him to the Goal.”65 
Another formulation of the prohibition on armed travel described it in terms 
of traveling with “offensive arms,” a category that encompassed but was not 
restricted to firearms. Although a firearm was always an offensive weapon under 
English law, other items in certain circumstances could fit this legal definition.66 
The infamous Black Act (1723), which punished poachers, and several of the acts 
passed against smuggling in the eighteenth-century referred to “firearms and 
other offensive weapons.”67 The Complete Dictionary of Arts and Sciences (1764) 
defined firearms as the quintessential offensive weapons in the eyes of the law: 
“GUN, fire-arm, a weapon of offense. . . .”68 Defensive weapons were understood 
in traditional terms, such as shields and armor.69 Under English law, a gun was 
always an offensive weapon.70 
Another common formulation of the prohibition on armed travel described 
the crime in terms of traveling with “dangerous or unusual weapons.”71 Hawkins, 
in his influential Pleas to the Crown, chose a slightly different way to describe the 
same principle. He noted that the prohibition extended to arming with 
“dangerous and unusual weapons.”72 All of these legal formulations aimed to 
   
 
LAMBARDE, supra note 54, at 6–14. 
 63.  JACOB, supra note 40, at 426; see also MICHAEL DALTON, THE COUNTRY JUSTICE, 
CONTAINING THE PRACTICE OF THE JUSTICES OF THE PEACE OUT OF THEIR SESSIONS 30 (1618) 
(providing a similar account).  
 64.  J.P. GENT, A NEW GUIDE FOR CONSTABLES, HEAD-BOROUGHS, TYTHINGMEN, 
CHURCHWARDENS 13 (1705) (clearly distinguished between being offensively armed and the crime of 
affray). See also, BURN, supra note 51.  
 65.  JOSEPH KEBLE, AN ASSISTANCE TO JUSTICES OF THE PEACE, FOR THE EASIER 
PERFORMANCE OF THEIR DUTY 147, 224 (1683). 
 66.  JELLINGER SYMONS, EXCISE LAWS ABRIDGED, AND DIGESTED UNDER THEIR PROPER 
HEADS, IN ALPHABETICAL ORDER (2d ed. 1775); see also, E.P. THOMPSON, WHIGS AND HUNTERS: 
THE ORIGIN OF THE BLACK ACT (1975) (describing Parliament’s effort to punish poachers). 
 67.  THOMPSON, supra note 66 (describing Parliament’s effort to punish poachers).  
 68.  THE COMPLETE DICTIONARY OF ARTS AND SCIENCES (1764); THOMAS WALTER WILLIAMS, 
THE WHOLE LAW RELATIVE TO THE DUTY AND OFFICE OF A JUSTICE OF THE PEACE: COMPRISING 
ALSO THE AUTHORITY OF PARISH OFFICERS (1793). See also HAWKINS, supra note 39.  
 69.  CHARLES JAMES, A NEW AND ENLARGED MILITARY DICTIONARY (1805). 
 70.  For evidence of the way English law treated guns, see the sources cited supra notes 61–67.  
 71.  ROBERT GARDINER, THE COMPLETE CONSTABLE 9 (1724). 
 72.  4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 40, at *148–49 (1803). 
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achieve the same goal: limit armed travel in public, particularly in populous 
areas.73 
Concealable weapons posed a different set of problems from the Statute of 
Northampton as this Elizabethan era statute makes clear: 
Actes of Parliament remaining of force, which included the tenets of the Statute of 
Northampton to prohibit the carrying of Dagges, Pistolles, and such like, not only in 
Cities and Townes, [but] in all partes of the Realme in common high[ways], whereby 
her Majesties good qu[i]et people, desirous to live in peaceable manner, are in feare and 
danger of their lives.74 
Given that concealable weapons were culturally associated with furtive 
motives, it was only natural that English law categorically prohibited travel with 
them. Joseph Keble, author of the influential 1689 Justice of the Peace Manual, 
reiterated this prohibition on “Dag[ge]s and Pistols,” instructing peace officers 
to arrest any who traveled armed with these types of weapons.75 Localities, most 
notably the city of London, enacted their own specific bans on traveling armed 
with concealed weapons. London law prohibited traveling “by Night or by Day” 
with a “Hand-Gun, having therewith Powder and Match.”76 
V 
EXEMPTIONS TO THE STATUTE OF NORTHAMPTON’S PROHIBITION ON 
ARMED TRAVEL 
The Statute of Northampton had three distinctive components: the common 
law crime of affray, a ban on coming armed before the King’s representatives, 
and a prohibition on armed travel in populous areas.77 Determining if one’s 
actions constituted an affray was context dependent. The ban on appearing 
armed before the King’s representatives and armed travel in populous areas were 
categorical prohibitions. A number of interpretive canons were also associated 
   
 
 73.  Modern gun rights advocates and libertarians have interpreted this text anachronistically, 
arguing that weapons had to be both unusual and dangerous to trigger the prohibition. See discussion 
supra note 20. This interpretation is flawed on many levels. Early modern English often used 
“hendiadys,” a grammatical form in which a single idea is expressed by the use of two nouns linked by 
the conjunction “and.” For a brief discussion, see CHRIS BALDICK, THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF 
LITERARY TERMS 151 (3d ed., 2008); GENT, supra note 64 (arming offensively was a crime, making the 
act of carrying arms dangerous and therefore unusual); Samuel L. Bray, “Necessary and Proper” and 
“Cruel and Unusual”: Hendiadys In The Constitution 102 VA. L. REV. 687 (2016) (arguing for interpreting 
“necessary and proper” and “cruel and unusual” each as expressing a singular idea despite their 
conjunction of two terms).  
 74.  BY THE QUENNE ELIZABETH I: A PROCLAMATION AGAINST THE COMMON USE OF DAGGES, 
HANDGUNNES, HARQUEBUZES, CALLIUERS, AND COTES OF DEFENCE 1 (Christopher Barker, London 
1579) (internal quotations omitted).  
 75.  Id. See also GENT, supra note 64 (describing the Statute of Northampton’s prohibition of going 
“armed offensively” before the “King’s Justices” or in “Fairs or Markets”).  
 76.  WILLIAM BOHUN, PRIVILEGIA LONDINI: OR, THE LAWS, CUSTOMS, AND PRIVILEGES OF THE 
CITY OF LONDON 110 (1702).  
 77.  Statute of Northampton, 2 Edw. 3, c. 3 (1328). 
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with the Statute of Northampton and these were frequently included in popular 
legal guides and learned commentaries.78 
Charles James, author of A New and Enlarged Military Dictionary, 
summarized the common law crime of affray as follows: “By the common law, it 
is an offence for persons to go or ride armed with dangerous weapons.”79 Sir 
Edward Coke’s formulation of this crime was widely copied by the compilers of 
popular legal guidebooks in the eighteenth century.80 “Effrayer, which signifieth 
to terrifie, or bring fear; and which the Law understandeth to be a common 
wrong.”81 As with most crimes in this period of English history, proof of actual 
intent to do harm was not required. Instead, the intent could be inferred from the 
illegal act itself.82 In the 1689 edition of his Justice of the Peace manual, Joseph 
Keble offered a lucid account of why armed travel violated the King’s peace 
irrespective of any specific malicious intent: 
Yet may an Affray be, without word or blow given; as if a man shall shew himself 
furnished with Armour or Weapon which is not usually worn, it will strike a fear upon 
others that be not armed as he is; and therefore both the Statutes of Northampton made 
against wearing Armour, do speak of it. . . . 83 
Another Justice of the Peace manual written in 1769 echoed Keble’s view that 
the mere act of arming oneself created an asymmetry of power between the 
individual armed and those unarmed, a situation that caused terror to the 
people.84 Like previous commentators on the Statute of Northampton, the author 
noted that the act of riding armed was the crime that created a terror to the 
people, not a specific intent to terrorize.85 
 
 78.  BURN, supra note 51, at 13. 
 79.  CHARLES JAMES, A NEW AND ENLARGED MILITARY DICTIONARY (1805); see also Statute of 
Northampton, 2 Edw. 3, c. 3 (1328) (Eng.). On the common law crime of affray, see 4 BLACKSTONE, 
supra note 40, at *148–49 (1803); HAWKINS, supra note 39, at 135–36. 
 80.  In his account of the Statute of Northampton, gun rights activist David Kopel casts Tyrell as a 
modern libertarian who defended an expansive right to travel armed, a characterization that is almost 
the mirror image of what Tyrrell actually argues in the text. Kopel, supra note 20. Contra Charles, supra 
note 33 (providing an extensive critique of Kopel’s interpretation). 
 81.  MICHAEL DALTON, THE COUNTRY JUSTICE, CONTAINING THE PRACTICE OF THE JUSTICES 
OF THE PEACE OUT OF THEIR SESSIONS 30 (1618) (providing a similar account). 
 82.  As Simon Stern notes regarding Blackstone treatment of the concept of mens rea “Hence a 
modern reader might expect to find, in Blackstone’s account, some discussion of acts versus intentions, 
attempts versus completed offenses, and civil versus criminal proof standards, among other topics. That 
Blackstone pursues these subjects only tangentially and intermittently may be explained by the relatively 
scant attention devoted to them in the treatises and cases he had at his disposal. It was only in the 
nineteenth century, in a body of theoretical literature (and with the aid of an analytical method) 
facilitated to some extent by Blackstone’s model, that many of these distinctions came into visibility.” 
Simon Stern, Blackstone’s Criminal Law: Common-Law Harmonization and Legislative Reform, in 
FOUNDATIONAL TEXTS IN MODERN CRIMINAL LAW 61 (Markus D. Dubber ed., 2014).  
 83.  KEBLE, supra note 65, at 147. See also Statute of Northampton, 2 Edw. 3, c. 3 (1328) (Eng.), 20 
Rich. 2, c. 1 (1396-97) (Eng.) (explaining why the mere act of traveling with an arm triggered an affray 
irrespective of any particular threatening act or intent to commit a crime). 
 84.  JOHN WARD, THE LAW OF A JUSTICE OF PEACE AND PARISH OFFICER 6–7 (1769) (Describing 
that when a man furnishes “weapons not usually worn, it may strike a fear into others unarmed”). 
 85.  Keble and Ward each articulated the standard view that there was no legal requirement need to 
demonstrate a specific intent to cause terror because of asymmetrical nature of the encounter between 
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All of the English legal guides enumerated a clear list of exemptions from the 
general prohibition on traveling armed imposed by the Statute of Northampton.86 
It would hardly have been necessary for legal guidebooks to set out such a list if 
there had been a broad general right to travel armed in public. Among the most 
important exceptions were cases in which subjects assisted in the lawful 
suppression of violence, crime, riot, or revolt.87 Hawkins’ Pleas to the Crown 
made it clear that, arming to “suppress rioters, rebels, and enemies” or assist 
officers of the crown, was not subject to the restrictions imposed by the Statute 
of Northampton.88 Indeed, in this situation arming oneself was as much a civic 
obligation as it was a right. During the 1780 Gordon Riots in London, the 
Recorder of London, the city’s chief lawyer, described this hybrid right–
obligation in forceful terms: 
It seems, indeed, to be considered, by the ancient laws of this kingdom, not only a right, 
but as a duty; for all the subjects of the realm, who are able to bear arms, are bound to 
be ready, at all times, to assist the sheriff, and other civil magistrates, in the execution 
of the laws and the preservation of the public peace.89 
The duty to assist agents of the Crown did not by itself justify owning a gun.90 
The obligation merely meant one had to assist with whatever weapons one was 
legally entitled to possess.91 Although in extraordinary circumstances individuals 
might respond on their own to deal with one of these violations of the King’s 
peace, contemporary guidebooks underscored the fact that it was always better 
to await a summons by representative of the law before unilaterally arming 
oneself and traveling to provide assistance to restore the King’s peace.92 If there 
had been a broad and well-recognized right to travel armed in public, the advice 
 
an individual armed and one unarmed.  
 86.  See DALTON, supra note 63, at 30; GILES JACOB, A NEW LAW-DICTIONARY (1729); KEBLE, 
supra note 65, at 147, 224; JOHN MILTON NILES, THE CONNECTICUT CIVIL OFFICER 12 (1823) 
(demonstrating the continuity in English legal views on the limited nature of the right to travel armed in 
the period between the Glorious Revolution and the American Revolution); WARD, supra note 84, at 6–
7. 
 87.  WILLIAM HAWKINS, A SUMMARY OF THE CROWN-LAW BY WAY OF ABRIDGMENT OF 
SERJEANT HAWKINS’S PLEAS OF THE CROWN 155–63 (1728). 
 88.  Id. 
 89.  WILLIAM BLIZARD, DESULTORY REFLECTIONS ON POLICE: WITH AN ESSAY ON THE MEANS 
OF PREVENTING CRIMES AND AMENDING CRIMINALS 59–60 (1785). Joyce Lee Malcolm erroneously 
interprets this passage as asserting a broad individual right to have arms for personal protection, see 
MALCOLM, supra note 7. Malcolm takes this well-known exception to the general prohibition to be the 
norm under English law, one of many errors in her analysis. The Gordon Riots do not demonstrate a 
broad right to have arms or travel armed public, but quite the opposite. For an opposing view, see 
SCHWOERER, supra note 7.  
 90.  Until the middle of the eighteenth century, the restrictions of the game laws would have 
prohibited firearms ownership to those who failed to meet the property requirement. Those individuals 
who failed to meet this requirement would have been expected to show up with appropriate weapons to 
the station, either edged weapons or clubs. 
91.  Statute of Winchester, 1 Statutes of the Realm 26 1235–1377 (1275). “The needs of home defence 
were met by the enforcement of obligations under the Statute of Winchester (1285) which required all 
able-bodied males to carry arms in accordance with their station in life.” Ian W. Archer, The Burden of 
Taxation on Sixteenth-Century London 44 HIST. J. 599, 620 (2001).  
 92.  JOSEPH SHAW, THE PRACTICAL JUSTICE OF THE PEACE 81 (1728). 
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proffered by this guidebook would have made little sense. As one legal text put 
it: “the safest Way is to be armed in Assistance of the King’s Officers or Ministers 
of Justice.”93 
English law expressly forbid arming oneself in response to a specific 
impending threat.94 There was broad agreement on this rule. “A Man cannot 
excuse the wearing of such Armour in Publick, by alleging that such a one 
threatened him, and that he wears it for the Safety of his Person from Assault.”95 
The appropriate legal response was not to arm oneself. Instead one was required 
to ensure that a representative of the law, typically a justice of the peace, enforce 
the peace. 
Timothy Dalton’s discussion of this important common law method of 
enforcing the peace, Surety of the Peace, explained how representatives of the 
King’s peace and ordinary citizens might seek out a peace bond to prevent or 
punish individuals who might violate the Statute of Northampton: 
All such as shall go or ride armed (offensively) in Fairs, Markets, or elsewhere; or shall 
wear or carry any guns, dags or pistols charged . . . any Constable, seeing this, may arrest 
them, and may carry them before the Justice of the Peace, and the Justice may bind 
them to the peace. . . .96 
Further, Dalton echoed the view that one might not justify arming oneself 
because one had been threatened. “[Y]ea, though those Persons were so armed 
or weaponed for their defense upon any private quarrel,” did not excuse arming 
oneself which “striketh a fear and terror into the King’s subjects.”97 Rather than 
encourage individuals to arm themselves in response to such threats, English law 
required individuals to seek out a magistrate, justice of the peace, or constable 
and have the aggressor disarmed and placed under a peace bond. If one had 
reason to fear violence, the correct response was to seek out a representative of 
the King’s justice. 98  
VI 
ARMED TRAVEL AS A REBUKE TO THE KING’S PEACE AND MAJESTY 
It is also important to recognize that affray was a crime against the King’s 
peace. Justices of the peace, constables, and sheriffs, had broad discretion and 
latitude to arrest, disarm, or require a peace bond for those who threatened the 
King’s peace. Indeed, any individual within a community might approach a 
justice of the peace with evidence that a particular person posed a threat to public 
safety and impose a peace bond or even have the person disarmed and jailed.99 
Dalton’s Country Justice confidently asserted that any who “shall go or ride 
 
 93.  Id.  
 94.   HAWKINS, supra note 87, at 155–63 (1728). 
 95.  Id. 
 96.  DALTON, supra note 63, at 264.  
 97.  Id. 
 98.  SHAW, supra note 92, at 81 (1728). 
 99.  SAMUEL BLACKERBY, THE JUSTICE OF THE PEACE: HIS COMPANION 4 (1723). 
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armed offensively” were “accounted to be an Affray,” and causing a “Fear of the 
People” created a “breach of the peace.”100 
The paradigmatic exception to this general rule is itself instructive.  
Aristocrats enjoyed a class-based privilege to travel armed or travel with armed 
retainers in certain circumstances. Thus, there was a broad consensus that 
members of the aristocracy did not violate the provision of the statute when they 
armed themselves because such actions were not viewed as likely to provoke a 
terror.101 Theodore Barlow, another author of a popular legal guide, described 
this class-based privilege in lucid terms. “Wearing Arms, if not accompanied with 
Circumstances of Terror, is not within this Statute; therefore People of Rank and 
Distinction do not offend by wearing common Weapons.”102 Timothy 
Cunningham, author of several legal texts including a legal dictionary, echoed 
this account by commenting that men of “quality or fashion,” and their 
“attendants” were not subject to the general restrictions on armed travel.103 
The fact that some members of the elite classes enjoyed a limited exemption 
from prosecution for affray for mere possession of arms in public underscores the 
limited scope of this right. Noting the existence of such an exemption only made 
sense in the context of the broad prohibition on traveling armed in public. The 
right of English aristocrats to arms does not support the notion that there was a 
broad right of peaceable armed travel. Under English law, there was no general 
right to travel armed.104 
The notion that a broad right to peaceable armed travel existed in early 
modern England would have been legally incoherent given concepts such as the 
King’s peace and the King’s majesty. “The common law,” Blackstone observed, 
“hath ever had a special care and regard for the conservation of the peace; for 
peace is the very end and foundation of civil society.”105 Under English law “all 
offenses are either against the King’s Peace or his crown and dignity.”106 In 
addition, any “affront to that power, and breaches of those rights, are immediate 
 
 100.  DALTON, supra note 63, at 30. Cf. KEBLE, supra note 65; WARD, supra note 84 (providing a 
similar account of the cause of the terror at the root of the crime of affray). 
 101.  BURN, supra note 51, at 13.  
 102.  THEODORE BARLOW, THE JUSTICE OF PEACE: A TREATISE CONTAINING THE POWER AND 
DUTY OF THAT MAGISTRATE 12 (1745).  
 103.  GILES JACOB, A NEW LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1750) (entry under “Armour and Arms,” no 
pagination in original). 
104.  On rank in English Society, see KEITH WRIGHTSON, ENGLISH SOCIETY: 1580–1680 (1982). 
Eugene Volokh argues that, “only public carrying ‘accompanied with such circumstances as are apt to 
terrify the people’ was thus seen as prohibited; but ‘wearing common weapons’ in ‘the common fashion’ 
was legal.” Volokh, supra note 20, at 101. Volokh imputes a modern style mens rea requirement instead 
of applying the standards for criminal intent appropriate to early modern English law. For a discussion 
of the history of the mens rea requirement, see BINDER, supra note 20, at 8, 96, 113, 137–46. The 
references to common weapons carried in the common fashion is also read anachronistically. The 
exemption he notes was not general but was class specific and limited to aristocrats and the arms of their 
retainers, see the discussion in DALTON, supra note 63. HAWKINS, supra note 87. 
 105.  1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 29, at *349. 
 106.  Id. at *258. 
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offenses against him.”107 Merely traveling with arms impugned the majesty of the 
crown and implied that the King and his representatives were incapable of 
keeping the peace.108 Thus, to arm oneself, apart from the specific exemptions or 
the context-dependent exceptions recognized by the common law, was by its very 
nature a rebuke of the King’s peace and majesty.109 
Sir John Knight’s Case illustrates the way the Statute of Northampton should 
be set against a web of larger English principles, including the concept of the 
King’s Peace.110 Gun rights scholars have consistently misread the case, arguing 
that it helped establish a right of peaceable open carry. In fact, the case stood for 
the opposite principle. It revealed that even aristocrats, the one group expressly 
exempted from the Statute of Northampton, were not completely immune from 
prosecution for traveling with arms.111 
The case can only properly be understood within the historical context of the 
tense period between the Exclusion Crisis and the Glorious Revolution: a time 
when partisan and religious struggles divided the English nation.112 Rumors of 
conspiracies circulated widely.113 Issues of religious tolerance, the problem of 
monarchical succession, and the continuing battle between Parliament and the 
King were among the most important political and legal issues dividing 
England.114 The key figure in the case, Sir John Knight, was a militant Protestant, 
who opposed tolerance for Catholics and Dissenters. He was charged with 
violating the Statute of Northampton by walking armed about the streets of 
Bristol. 115 Sir John burst into a Catholic religious service to arrest a priest. These 
actions prompted his own arrest, and he was charged with affray and violating 
the Statute of Northampton. The jury, composed of other militant Protestants 
drawn from Knight’s community, was sympathetic to his anti-Catholicism and 
acquitted him.116 Although Knight escaped punishment thanks to a sympathetic 
jury, the government still imposed a peace bond on him as a surety of good 
behavior in the future.117 Thus, Knight was still punished for his actions. 
 
 107.  Id.  
 108.  Peter Lake & Steve Pincus, Rethinking the Public Sphere in Early Modern England, 45 J. BR. 
STUD. 270, 277 (2006). 
 109.  See discussion supra note 104. 
 110.  See 87 Eng. Rep. 75 (1686).  
 111.  But cf. David Kopel, The First Century of Right to Arms Litigation, 14 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 
(2016) (misinterpreting Sir John Knight’s Case by concluding that “Everyone in the case agreed that the 
Statute of Northampton outlawed only carrying in a terrifying manner.”). Malcolm also misreads the 
case, see MALCOLM, supra note 7, at 104–05. 
 112.  See J.G.A. Pocock & Gordon J. Schocket, Interregnum and Restoration, in THE VARIETIES OF 
BRITISH POLITICAL THOUGHT 146 (J.G.A. Pocock et al. eds., 1993) (providing a useful overview of the 
topic). 
 113.  See STEVEN C.A. PINCUS, ENGLAND’S GLORIOUS REVOLUTION 1688–1689: A BRIEF HISTORY 
WITH DOCUMENTS (2005). 
 114.  Id. 
 115.  NARCISSUS LUTTRELL, 1 A BRIEF HISTORICAL RELATION OF STATE AFFAIRS FROM 
SEPTEMBER 1678 TO APRIL 1714 389 (1857). 
 116.  Id.  
 117.  87 Eng. Rep. 75 (1686) (The militantly Protestant jury had essentially nullified the charge by 
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Far from proving that a permissive attitude towards firearms had emerged by 
the end of the seventeenth century, the case shows that even members of the 
aristocracy, the one group expressly exempted from the prohibition on armed 
travel, were not entirely free to exercise this right in public with impunity. 
Further, the case gives no indication that the English Courts had abandoned the 
principles embedded in the Statute of Northampton or that it had fallen into 
desuetude. It was the jury, not the judges, who reached the verdict in this highly 
politicized setting. Finally, rather than demonstrate that the Statute of 
Northampton had ceased to have any meaning under English law, the judges and 
subsequent legal commentators on Sir John Knight’s Case offered a very different 
gloss on the meaning of the case. The case reporter itself reminded readers that 
the common law offense of affray was not simply a crime against a specific 
individual or even the local community but a crime against the public and hence 
a direct challenge to the legal authority of the King.118 The private act of arming 
oneself was an inherent affront to the King because it implied that the “King 
w[as] not able or willing to protect his subjects.”119 
VII 
COLONIAL TEXTS, THE ENGLISH LEGACY, AND THE AMERICANIZATION OF 
THE COMMON LAW 
Popular legal guidebooks published in the colonies repeated the standard 
interpretations of the Statute of Northampton that had appeared in English legal 
texts. George Webb’s Virginian Justice of Peace (1736) was the first text 
published in Virginia.120 Four decades later another popular guide appeared in 
North Carolina and it framed these issues in language drawn directly from 
English authority: “Justices of the Peace, upon their own View, or upon 
Complaint, may apprehend any Person who shall go or ride armed with unusual 
and offensive weapons, in an Affray, or among any great Concourse of People. . 
. .”121 Both texts recognized the continuing relevance of earlier categorical 
prohibitions, such as not coming armed before the King’s representatives. These 
new American texts generally tracked earlier English texts closely in most 
regards. The legal consequences of slavery figured in these texts to different 
degrees, but the general framework applied to armed travel in public remained 
largely, but not entirely, consistent with earlier English law in this area.122 One of 
 
finding in favor of Knight so the Court’s only legal option was a peace bond. The case does not 
demonstrate that the traveling armed in public had been normalized or decriminalized, but the exact 
opposite.) 
 118.  See Charles, supra note 33.  
 119.  87 Eng. Rep. 75 (1686). 
 120.  GEORGE WEBB, VIRGINIAN JUSTICE OF PEACE (1736).  
 121.  See JAMES DAVIS, THE OFFICE AND AUTHORITY OF A JUSTICE OF THE PEACE 13 (1774) 
(citing MICHAEL DALTON, THE COUNTRY JUSTICE CONTAINING THE PRACTICE, DUTY AND POWER 
OF THE JUSTICES OF THE PEACE AS WELL IN AS OUT OF THEIR SESSIONS 37 (1705)). Webb expressly 
framed the prohibition in general terms of traveling armed in populous areas.  
 122.  See id.  
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the most pronounced differences between colonial law and English law was the 
expansion of the number of situations in which individuals were required to carry 
arms to enforce the peace. Under the common law, subjects could be required to 
assist agents of the crown in preserving the peace.123 The raising of the “hue and 
cry” was one of the most important examples of an exception to the prohibition 
on armed travel.124 Constables and other representatives of the King’s justice 
were empowered to raise the hue and cry and enlist subjects to apprehend felons. 
Once the hue and cry was raised, individuals were allowed to arm themselves 
with whatever weapons they were legally entitled to possess.125 
In some colonies, most notably southern colonies, those eligible to bear arms 
might also be required to travel armed on occasions not related to musters, such 
as going to church.126 These laws were another adaptation to the realities of 
colonial life, especially the ongoing hostile relationship with Native Americans 
and the omnipresent danger of slave uprisings in the South. Relations between 
Virginians and their Indian neighbors were exceedingly tense in 1619. This helps 
account for Virginia’s passage of a law expanding the scope of normal militia 
duties and requiring colonists liable to bear arms127 to travel armed to church.128  
ALL men that are fittinge to beare armes, shall bringe their peices to the church uppon 
payne for every effence, if the default be in the master, to pay 2lb. of tobacco, to be 
disposed by the church-wardens, who shall levy it by distresse, and the servants shall be 
punished commander. 129 
When read in context, the law demonstrates the extraordinary power early 
colonial governments exercised over inhabitants. Further, it does not vindicate a 
strong liberty interest that might be claimed against government authority. A 
similar act was passed by the Georgia legislature in 1770,  that  required “every 
white male inhabitant of this province . . . who is or shall be liable to bear arms in 
the militia” to bring arms to church.130 The preamble of the Statute made clear 
that the purpose of the law was to promote the “necessary . . . security and 
defense of this province from internal dangers and insurrections. . . .”131 
The militia played a far more significant role in the colonies than it did in 
England. It served as a first line of defense against external and internal threats 
 
123.   HAWKINS, supra note 87, at 155–63.  
 124.  SIR JOHN COMYNS, A DIGEST OF THE LAW OF ENGLAND 358 (4th ed. 1793).   
 125.  See also Statute of Winchester, supra note 91. 
 126.  See WILLIAM WALLER HENING, THE STATUTES AT LARGE 198 (1823). 
 127.  This requirement only applied to individuals who were already able to bear arms, a subset of the 
white male population.  
 128.  See HENING, supra note 126. Early Virginia imposed a variety of obligations on its residents, 
especially regarding religion. Parents could be penalized for not properly instructing children and 
apprentices in the catechism endorsed by the Church of England. Id. at 181–82. It also taxed colonists to 
support the established church and penalized those who failed to attend church. Id. at 184. In short, 
modern style rights were in short supply in early Virginia. 
 129.  Id. at 174. 
 130.  Act of Feb. 27, 1770, No. 191 (Judiciary Act of Georgia of 1770), in ROBERT WATKINS & 
GEORGE WATKINS, A DIGEST OF THE LAWS OF THE STATE OF GEORGIA 157 (1800). 
 131.  Id.  
CORNELL_PROOF (DO NOT DELETE) 4/28/2017  11:53 AM 
No. 2 2017] PRESERVING LIBERTY AND KEEPING THE PEACE 29 
and was one of the most important local institutions in many communities.132 
Most colonies, with Quaker Pennsylvania being a notable exception, typically 
required adult white men between the ages of sixteen and forty-five, who were 
not infirm or exempt because of their occupation, to equip themselves with a 
musket or rifle and participate in the militia.133 The notion that the militia was 
literally the people was a potent rhetorical form, but largely a fiction. Although 
a substantial portion of the adult free male population was required to participate 
in the militia, equating the militia with the people is a mistake.134 
One of the clearest expositions of the way the constitutional ideal of the 
militia had been transformed by the colonial experience occurs in a remarkable 
series of essays published by Samuel Adams in the midst of the worsening 
relations with Britain prior to the American Revolution. Adams defended the 
Boston Town meeting’s decision to call on residents to arms themselves, invoking 
English and local legal authority. 
For it is certainly beyond human art and sophistry to prove that British subjects, to 
whom the privilege of possessing arms is expressly recognized by the Bill of Rights, and, 
who live in a province where the law requires them to be equip’d with arms, &c. are 
guilty of an illegal act, in calling upon one another to be provided with them, as the law 
directs.135 
How little do those persons attend to the rights of the constitution, if they know 
anything about them, who find fault with a late vote of this town, calling upon the 
inhabitants to provide themselves with arms for their defence at any time; but more 
especially, when they had reason to fear, there would be a necessity of the means of self 
preservation against the violence of oppression. —Every one knows that the exercise of 
the military power is forever dangerous to civil rights. . . .136 
Adams did not rest his claim entirely on British sources alone, but also 
invoked American law, specifically the militia law of the colony. The right Adams 
described does not easily fit into the simple dichotomies that have defined Second 
Amendment debate in the modern era. The right was one exercised by 
individuals, but it was one effectuated by the Boston town meeting acting 
collectively under legal authority it possessed. Individuals did not act on their 
own accord, but acted in concert for a collective public purpose—the protection 
of constitutional liberty. Nor was the right claimed by Adams and other colonists 
a pure expression of natural rights. Boston had not entered the state of nature. 
The appeal was to law, not to extra-legal authority. This particular right was an 
expression of ordered liberty and only made sense within the context of the rule 
of law. Bostonians were not simply asserting a common law right of self-defense. 
The right they claimed was distinctly American, it fused together 
 
 132.  Kevin Sweeney, Firearms, Militias, and the Second Amendment, in THE SECOND AMENDMENT 
ON TRIAL, supra note 5, at 310 (discussing the role of the militia in early American society). 
 133.  See id.  
 134.  Id. 
 135.  SAMUEL ADAMS, THE WRITINGS OF SAMUEL ADAMS 299 (Harry Alonzo Cushing ed., 1904). 
For more on Adams, see SAUL CORNELL, A WELL-REGULATED MILITIA: THE FOUNDING FATHERS 
AND THE ORIGINS OF GUN CONTROL IN AMERICA (2006). 
 136.  ADAMS, supra note 135, at 318. 
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 several different traditional English rights claims and merged them with 
American legal practices, effectively recasting them in a new distinctly American 
constitutional framework.137 
VIII 
THE ABSORPTION OF THE COMMON LAW IN POST-REVOLUTIONARY 
AMERICA 
Samuel Adams and the Boston town meeting were engaging in a creative 
process of constitutional theorizing and they were hardly unique in 
Revolutionary America. Towns and communities across the nation had been 
swept up in the political and constitutional ferment triggered by the imperial 
crisis. These developments were accelerated when the Continental Congress 
instructed the states to draft new constitutions a month before Independence was 
officially declared.138 These first state constitutions typically included a written 
declaration of rights. These new documents radically transformed many aspects 
of American law, but they did not represent a complete break with pre-existing 
English law, particularly regarding arms. Although a majority of the new 
constitutions included prohibitions on standing armies, most did not single out 
the right to bear arms for express protection. Pennsylvania was the first state to 
do so, but it also included a right not to be forced to bear arms, a concession to 
religious pacifists such as Quakers, Moravians, and Mennonites. Typically arms 
bearing provisions also included express language about the need for civilian 
control of the military. The pairing of the right to bear arms with a right not to 
bear arms, and the close textual connection between the affirmation of civilian 
control of the military and the right to bear arms only heightens the strong 
military focus of these early provisions. 
The American Revolution’s impact on the common law, including the right 
to keep arms and restrictions on armed travel, was even more complicated. 
Rather than speak of the common law’s Americanization, it might be accurate to 
discuss its creolization in the colonial era and early Republic. Although there 
were some important areas in which English law remained stable, there were also 
many examples in which the law had evolved to reflect the different social and 
legal realities of different colonies.139  
Stressing the pervasive localism and evolutionary character of the absorption 
of the common law, the distinguished Virginia jurist St. George Tucker believed 
that: 
 
 137.  See CORNELL, supra note 135; Steven G. Calabresi et al., State Bills of Rights in 1787 and 1791: 
What Individual Rights are Really Deeply Rooted in American History and Tradition?, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 
1451 (2012). 
 138.  G. EDWARD WHITE, LAW IN AMERICAN HISTORY 143 (2012).  
 139.  WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE COMMON LAW IN COLONIAL America (2008); Lauren Benton & 
Kathryn Walker, Law for the Empire: The Common Law In Colonial America and the Problem of Legal 
Diversity, 89 CHI. KENT. L. REV. 937 (2014) (discussing the way different regional legal cultures emerged 
and transformed the common law). 
CORNELL_PROOF (DO NOT DELETE) 4/28/2017  11:53 AM 
No. 2 2017] PRESERVING LIBERTY AND KEEPING THE PEACE 31 
the adoption of the laws of England, we see was confined to such as had been 
theretofore adopted, used, and approved, within the colony, and usually practiced on, 
in the courts of law; with an exception as to such parts as were repugnant to the rights 
and liberties contained in the constitution.140 
Moreover, Tucker noted that one might have recourse to “every law treatise 
from Bracton, and Glanville, to Coke, Hale, Hawkins, and Blackstone; or in 
every reporter from the year-books to the days of Lord Mansfield,” but such 
authority mattered little if the law was not consistent with the new state 
constitutions.141 If that were the case, a law contrary to the text of the Constitution 
would “have no more force in Massachusetts, than an edict of the emperor of 
China.”142 
Some states absorbed the common law by constitutional means. Thus, 
Maryland’s Declaration of Rights affirmed: 
The Common Law of England, and the trial by Jury, according to the course of that law, 
and to the benefit of such of the English statutes as existed on the Fourth day of July, 
seventeen hundred and seventy-six; and which, by experience, have been found 
applicable to their local and other circumstances, and have been introduced, used and 
practiced by the Courts of Law or Equity.143 
Some states passed reception statutes, incorporating parts of the common 
law. Pennsylvania’s statute affirmed that: 
[E]ach and every one of the laws or acts of general assembly that were in force and 
binding on the inhabitants of the said province on the fourteenth day of May last shall 
be in force and binding on the inhabitants of this state from and after the tenth day of 
February next . . . and the common law and such of the statute laws of England as have 
heretofore been in force in the said province, except as is hereafter excepted.144 
The primary function of the justice of the peace in the new American 
Republic remained unchanged: to preserve the peace.145 The transformation of 
the English legal concept of the King’s peace into a post-Revolutionary legal 
concept consistent with republicanism did have implications for understanding 
the limits on armed travel in public. In particular, the notion of traveling armed 
as rebuke to the King’s majesty and authority no longer had any legal 
significance. In a society in which the people were sovereign, the notion of the 
peace was effectively republicanized. As a Connecticut guide for justices of the 
peace observed, “the term peace, denotes the condition of the body politic in 
 
 140.  ST. GEORGE TUCKER, BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES: WITH NOTES OF REFERENCE 214 
(1803). 
 141.  Id.  
 142.  Id.  
 143.  MD. CONST. art. III, § 1 (1776). See also William B. Stoebuck, Reception of English Common 
Law in the American Colonies, 10 WM. & MARY L. REV. 393 (1968) (describing how the American 
Colonies adopted the common law as the basis for judicial decisions). 
 144.  9 STATUTES AT LARGE OF PENNSYLVANIA 29–30 (Mitchell & Flanders eds., 1903).  
 145.  As Laura Edwards demonstrates, the traditional English practice of using private prosecutions 
for assault and similar crimes gradually gave way to a focus on public prosecution as an affront to the 
people’s peace in the South. See LAURA F. EDWARDS, THE PEOPLE AND THEIR PEACE: LEGAL 
CULTURE AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF INEQUALITY IN THE POST-REVOLUTIONARY SOUTH 
(2009). 
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which no person suffers, or has just cause to fear any injury.”146 The offense was 
now one that harmed the body politic, not the King’s Majesty. Disturbing the 
peace remained a serious legal matter, and Justices of the Peace continued to 
exercise considerable power and authority, including a power to preempt 
violence by imposing peace bonds, disarmament, or incarceration. 
A number of states, including North Carolina, Virginia, and Massachusetts 
expressly adopted their own versions of the Statute of Northampton.147 North 
Carolina’s formulation of the prohibition followed closely on its English 
predecessor. It declared that no person may “go nor ride armed by night nor by 
day, in fairs, markets, nor in the presence of the King’s Justices, or other 
ministers, nor in no part elsewhere.”148 Virginia’s statute also drew on the original 
English text, with one important change, noted by William Henig, a leading 
lawyer in the state, who remarked that the legislature introduced additional due 
process protections for those accused of violating the law. “The act of assembly 
of Virginia materially differs from the act of parliament” he wrote, “being more 
favorable to liberty.”149 In Virginia, a justice of the peace could not seize arms 
and imprison an individual for more than a month. To impose a stiffer penalty 
required a jury verdict, a higher due process standard, and hence a greater 
safeguard for liberty.150 
In 1795, Massachusetts enacted its own version of the Statute of Northampton 
drawn from prior English commentators. The law forbade anyone who “shall ride 
or go armed offensively, to the fear or terror of the good citizens of this 
Commonwealth.”151 This was a common gloss on the Statute of Northampton 
used in many of the popular English Justice of the Peace manuals of the previous 
century. It framed the prohibition in terms of traveling with offensive weapons. 
The criminal conduct did not require the demonstration of a modern style mens 
rea; the mere act of traveling armed with offensive weapons demonstrated the 
evil intent required by law.152 
  
 
 146.  JOSEPH BACKUS, THE JUSTICE OF THE PEACE 23 (1816). 
 147.  See A COLLECTION OF ALL SUCH ACTS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF VIRGINIA, OF A 
PUBLIC AND PERMANENT NATURE, AS ARE NOW IN FORCE 33 (1794) (prohibiting individuals from “ 
go[ing] or ride[ing] armed by night or day”); FRANCOIS XAVIER MARTIN, A COLLECTION OF STATUTES 
OF THE PARLIAMENT OF ENGLAND IN FORCE IN THE STATE OF NORTH-CAROLINA 60–61 (1792) 
(prohibiting conduct by individuals who “go nor ride armed by night nor by day”); FRANCOIS XAVIER 
MARTIN, A TREATISE ON THE POWER AND DUTIES OF A CONSTABLE ACCORDING TO THE LAW OF 
NORTH CAROLINA 9 (1806). 
 148. FRANÇOIS X. MARTIN, THE OFFICE AND AUTHORITY OF A JUSTICE OF THE PEACE, AND OF 
SHERIFFS, CORONERS, &C. ACCORDING TO THE LAW OF THE STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA 84 (1804). 
 149.  WILLIAM WALLER HENING, THE NEW VIRGINIA JUSTICE 50 (1810). 
 150.  Id. 
 151.  ASAHEL STEARNS & LEMUEL SHAW, THE GENERAL LAWS OF MASSACHUSETTS 454 (Theron 
Metcalf ed., 1823).  
 152.  See BINDER, supra note 20.  
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IX 
THE EMERGENCE OF OPPOSING MODELS OF THE RIGHT TO CARRY IN THE 
EARLY REPUBLIC 
In the preface to his edition of Blackstone, St. George Tucker explained that 
his project was inspired by the need to educate Americans about how the 
common law had evolved in America. Tucker conceded that it would have been 
an even more monumental undertaking to try to explicate how this process 
differed from state to state, so he focused most of attention on his home state of 
Virginia.153 Although it is tempting for modern scholars to treat Tucker as if his 
writings were some type of proxy for an American legal mind, such an approach 
distorts the fact that Tucker’s vision of law was not simply rooted in his 
experiences as a Virginian, but also in his growing opposition to Federalist 
constitutionalism. Tucker was an ardent Jeffersonian and any interpretation of 
his thought that fails to acknowledge this fact is likely to distort his influence and 
significance.154 Consider Tucker’s often quoted observation, written in response 
to the prosecution of Fries’s Rebellion in Pennsylvania.155 
But ought that circumstances of itself to create any such presumption in America, where 
the right to bear arms is recognized and secured in the constitution itself. In many parts 
of the United State, a man no more thinks, of going out of his house on any occasion, 
without his rifle or musket in his hand, than an European fine gentleman without his 
sword by his side.156 
Tucker was commenting on a federal case that he believed had been decided 
incorrectly, so it is odd that modern lawyers would treat his comment, and not 
the federal court decision, as the legally authoritative source. Secondly, Tucker 
did not claim that the situation in Virginia was universally recognized in all parts 
of America, but was only true in some areas. Finally, Tucker was talking about a 
musket, the standard weapon of the militia, and not about concealable weapons.  
Justice Samuel Chase certainly did not share Tucker’s views and the successful 
prosecution of the rebels in both the Whiskey Rebellion and Fries Rebellion later 
in the decade suggests that Chase’s narrow Federalist view, not the more 
expansive Jeffersonian view espoused by Tucker, was the legally dominant view 
of federal courts at this moment in time.157 Tucker took exception to Federalist 
 
 153.  TUCKER, supra note 140, at 1–9.  
 154.  See Saul Cornell, Meaning and Understanding in the History of Constitutional Ideas: The 
Intellectual History Alternative to Originalism, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 721 (2013) (discussing the problem 
of taking a single complex thinker such as Tucker and treating him as proxy for a monolithic American 
Mind); Saul Cornell, St. George Tucker and the Second Amendment: Original Understandings and 
Modern Misunderstandings, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1123 (2006) (explaining the need to root Tucker’s 
constitutional thought, including his views of the Second Amendment, in the growing rift between 
Federalists and Jeffersonians in the 1790s). 
 155.  For gun rights misinterpretations of Tucker, see Stephen P. Halbrook, St. George Tucker’s 
Second Amendment: Deconstructing “The True Palladium of Liberty”, 3 TENN. J.L. & POL’Y 120 (2006); 
James Lindgren, Forward: The Past and Future of Guns, 104 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 705 (2015). 
 156.  TUCKER, supra note 140, at Appendix B.  
 157.  PAUL DOUGLAS NEWMAN, FRIES’S REBELLION: THE ENDURING STRUGGLE FOR THE 
AMERICAN REVOLUTION (2004). 
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Chase’s reliance on traditional English legal authorities, which was particularly 
disturbing, given his fears that Federalists intended to use the common methods 
and principles to expand federal power.158 In contrast to Chase and other 
Federalists, Tucker believed that American law had not absorbed English 
common law’s broad view of treason. Under English law, a group of armed men 
traveling was at the very least a riotous assembly and depending on the 
circumstance a potentially treasonous one. Tucker did not believe that this was 
the case in Virginia and his often quoted comment about Virginian’s traveling 
with their muskets should be placed in that broader context. 
The fact that Tucker discerned a clear difference between Virginia and 
Pennsylvania on this important point of law as early as the 1790s serves as a 
reminder that the meaning of arms bearing was not static in the early American 
republic, but evolving.159 Indeed, as the market revolution made cheap and 
reliable hand guns more plentiful, the practice of carrying these weapons in 
public grow at an alarming rate. It was this new practice of traveling with 
concealed weapons that prompted the first wave of modern style gun control 
measures in the South.160 Kentucky’s law was challenged and declared 
unconstitutional in Bliss v. Commonwealth (1822).161 The court in Bliss took an 
almost absolutist view of the right to bear arms, viewing any regulation as 
tantamount to a destruction of the right.162 Elsewhere in the South, a permissive, 
but less absolutist view took hold. A Richmond Grand Jury (1820) captured this 
strain of southern thought when it published a statement attacking the dastardly 
practice of concealed carry, but reiterated that open carry of arms was perfectly 
legal and honorable. Although the Grand Jury opposed “any legislative 
interference with what they conceive to be one of the most essential privileges of 
freemen, the right of carrying arms” they were equally adamant about expressing 
their “abhorrence of a practice which it becomes all good citizens to frown upon 
with contempt, and to endeavor to suppress.” The cowardly “practice of carrying  
  
 
 158.  The Jeffersonian opposition in the 1790s feared Federalists were attempting to use English legal 
methods to expand the power of the Constitution by importing common law ideas, including those about 
treason, see Kathryn Preyer, Jurisdiction to Punish: Federal Authority, Federalism and the Common Law 
of Crimes in the Early Republic 4 LAW & HIST. REV. 223 (1986). 
 159.  See CORNELL, supra note 135. 
 160.  Cf. ACTS PASSED AT THE FIRST SESSION OF THE TWENTY-FIRST GENERAL ASSEMBLY FOR 
THE COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY 100–01 (1813) (“An Act to prevent persons in this 
Commonwealth from wearing concealed Arms, except in certain cases” approved in 1813); ACTS PASSED 
AT THE SECOND SESSION OF THE FIRST LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF LOUISIANA 172–75 (1813) 
(“An Act against carrying concealed weapons, and going armed in public places in an unnecessary 
manner” approved in 1813); THE REVISED LAWS OF INDIANA, ADOPTED AND ENACTED BY THE 
GENERAL ASSEMBLY AT THEIR EIGHTH SESSION 79 (1824) (“An Act to prohibit the wearing of 
Concealed Weapons” approved in 1820); ARK. REV. STAT. div. VIII, ch. 44 (1838); Act of Oct. 19, 1821, 
ch. 13, 1821 Tenn. Pub. Acts 15. Early Indiana was settled by southerners which makes its situation similar 
to that of other southern states. Nicole Etcheson, Manliness and the Political Culture of the Old 
Northwest, 1790–1860, 15 J. EARLY REP. 59, 60 n.2 (1995). 
 161.  Bliss v. Commonwealth, 12 Ky. 90 (1822). 
 162.  Id. 
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arms secreted, in cases where no personal attack can reasonably be 
apprehended.”163 
One of the most thoughtful discussions of how the common law tradition had 
evolved in the South was Charles Humphreys’ Compendium of the Common Law 
in force in Kentucky, which attempted to do for Kentucky what Tucker had done 
for Virginia: analyze the way English law had been modified and adapted to 
circumstances in Kentucky.164 Humphreys specifically took up the question of 
how the state’s constitutional provisions on the right to bear arms, as interpreted 
by the courts, had modified common law restrictions on “riding or going armed 
with dangerous or unusual weapons.” Although Kentucky had not abandoned 
this ancient concept, it had modified it to reflect the radically altered context and 
legal situation in the American South. Determining whether one had violated the 
peace meant one had to acknowledge that if “in this country the constitution 
guaranties to all persons the right to bear arms; then it can only be a crime to 
exercise this right in such a manner, as to terrify the people unnecessarily.”165 
Interestingly, Humphreys implicitly acknowledged the traditional standard that 
armed travel was a terror to the people, but he noted that in  Kentucky that legal 
bar had been raised, a heightened standard that he described as terrifying “the 
people unnecessarily.”166 Yet, even Kentucky eventually backed away from this 
extreme libertarian interpretation which  was eventually rejected when Kentucky 
revised its constitution in 1849; the new constitution included an express 
provision that “the General Assembly may pass laws to prevent persons from 
carrying concealed arms.”167 
The distinctive Southern interpretation of the English common law crime of 
affray was elaborated in  State v. Huntley (1843).168 North Carolina’s highest 
Court noted that “no man amongst us carries it [a gun] about with him, as one of 
his every day accoutrements—as a part of his dress.” Yet, echoing the views of 
Humphreys and other southern commentators, the court went on to observe that 
it “is to be remembered that the carrying of a gun per se constitutes no offence. 
For any lawful purpose—either of business or amusement—the citizen is at 
perfect liberty to carry his gun.”169  Striking a note similar to Humphrey, the court 
noted: “It is the wicked purpose—and the mischievous result—which essentially 
constitute the crime. He shall not carry about this or any other weapon of death 
to terrify and alarm, and in such manner as naturally will terrify and alarm, a 
peaceful people.”170 State v. Huntley broke with traditional English common law 
in two important respects. First, it implicitly recognized that in North Carolina, 
 
 163.  On Wearing Concealed Arms, DAILY NAT’L INTELLIGENCER (Sept. 9, 1820).  
 164.  CHARLES HUMPHREYS, A COMPENDIUM OF THE COMMON LAW IN FORCE IN KENTUCKY 
(1822). 
    165.  Id. 
 166.  Id. 
 167.  KY. CONST. art. III, § 25 (1850).  
 168.  State v. Huntly, 25 N.C. (3 Ired.) 418 (1843). 
    169.   Id. 
    170.    Id.  
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the range of legitimate uses of firearms was considerably broader than it had been 
under common law, encompassing both “business or amusement.” The law still 
required a legitimate purpose to carry arms, noting that one did not sport arms 
daily in public, but it acknowledged by its choice of terms a considerable range 
of legitimate activities. The case also reflected a more profound change in the 
nature of criminal law. Under the traditional English common law view, the 
necessary evil intent for a criminal act could be inferred from the prohibited act 
itself. Huntley represents a more modern conception, one in which subjective 
intent was necessary to establish the mens rea requirement which was an essential 
element of a crime. Gun rights scholars, most notably David Kopel and Eugene 
Volokh, have read Huntley’s modern-style mens rea requirement back into 
English legal history, assuming that this requirement existed centuries before it 
became a part of the law. Their failure to grasp their error follows from a more 
basic flaw that historian David Hackett Fischer describes as the fallacy of tunnel 
history.171 Writing about the history of the crime of affray without consulting any 
of the standard accounts of the history of Anglo-American criminal law led Kopel 
and Volokh to ignore the differences between early modern and modern criminal 
law.172 
The line of cases that led to Huntley represented one of two Southern 
jurisprudential traditions regarding firearms. A different, more limited 
conception of the right to keep and bear arms, one more consistent with the 
traditional eighteenth century militia-based understanding of the right also 
gained judicial notice in other parts of the South. This alternative vision was 
elaborated in two cases, Aymette v. State and State v. Buzzard.173 In both of these 
cases the meaning of the right to bear arms was shaped by the traditional civic 
republican understanding of the militia. Such a conception was neither an 
individual right in the modern sense, nor was it as narrowly framed as a right of 
the states—the essence of the modern collective rights theory of the right to bear 
arms.174 Laws that inhibited the ability of citizens to keep and bear those arms 
needed to fulfill their militia obligation would have been unconstitutional. 
Firearms with little or no value to the preservation of the militia, easily concealed 
pocket pistols being a notable example, were treated as ordinary property and 
subject to the full range of the state’s police powers, including in the case of some 
especially dangerous weapons, prohibition. In Aymette, the court wrote: “The 
legislature, therefore, have a right to prohibit the wearing, or keeping weapons 
 
 171.  See DAVID HACKETT FISCHER, HISTORIANS’ FALLACIES: TOWARD A LOGIC OF HISTORICAL 
THOUGHT 142 (1970). 
 172.  See Volokh, supra note 20, at 101 (erroneously asserting that “the Statute was understood by 
the Framers as covering only those circumstances where carrying of arms was unusual and therefore 
terrifying.”); David Kopel, The First Century of Right to Arms Litigation, 14 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 
(2016) (confusing the jury’s act of nullification of the statute with the judge’s views and ignoring the fact 
that the judges imposed a peace bond for a violation of the Statute of Northampton). 
 173.  Aymette v. State, 21 Tenn. (2 Hum.) 154 (1840); State v. Buzzard, 4 Ark. 18 (1842).  
 174.  For an overview of the modern individual rights and collective rights theories of the Second 
Amendment, see THE SECOND AMENDMENT ON TRIAL, supra note 5. 
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dangerous to the peace and safety of the citizens, and which are not usual in 
civilized warfare, or would not contribute to the common defence.”175 
Given that modern law is dominated by the discourse of rights, it has been 
difficult for gun rights scholars to make the imaginative leap of faith necessary to 
understand how the right to bear arms could be anything other than an individual 
right of self-defense.176 To understand the Second Amendment one must grasp 
the fears that animated it: the disarmament of the militia. Although modern 
Americans fear “black helicopters” and government agents coming to take their 
guns away, the Founding generation recognized that indifference and debt posed 
at least as great a danger to militia armament as direct government action. In 
particular, debt was a pervasive feature of economic life in the agricultural 
communities of early America. Farmers were dependent on borrowing money 
until crops were sold at market and loans might be repaid.177 Protecting privately 
owned militia weapons from seizure in lawsuits was of paramount importance in 
making sure that the militia would not simply disarm itself as citizens sold off 
muskets to pay their debts. In virtually every state, militia laws protected 
 
 175.  Aymette v. State, 21 Tenn. (2 Hum.) 154 (1840). Michael P. O’Shea, Modeling the Second 
Amendment Right to Carry Arms (I): Judicial Tradition and the Scope of “Bearing Arms” for Self-
Defense, 61 AM. U.L. REV. 585 (2012) typifies the gun rights misreading of this tradition. O’Shea offers 
no explanation of why a common law right of self-defense and a civic constitutional right could not have 
existed separately from one another. Instead, he simply assumes that rights embedded in the Bill of 
Rights have always been treated the same at all times and places in American history, a dubious historical 
proposition with little factual bais. “Why not the hybrid view of the right, which combines a militia 
purpose with a personal guarantee against disarmament, thereby treating the Second Amendment ‘right 
of the people’ in the same way the other rights of the people in the Bill of Rights have been treated?”  
For a critique of this type of ahistorical approach to eighteenth century rights, see Cornell, Meaning and 
Understanding, supra note 154. 
 176.  On the difficulty of conceptualizing bearing arms outside of the modern rights discourse, see 
Joseph Blocher, Gun Rights Talk, 94 B.U. L. REV. 813 (2014). For examples of gun rights scholars who 
have trouble understanding that “the past is a foreign country,” DAVID LOWENTHAL, THE PAST IS A 
FOREIGN COUNTRY (1985), in which conceptions of rights might not function in the same way as they 
do in contemporary law, see Nicholas J. Johnson, Rights Versus Duties, History Department Lawyering, 
and the Incoherence of Justice Stevens’s Heller Dissent, 39 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1503 (2012) (arguing 
anachronistically that the idea that rights might impose duties makes no sense because modern 
conceptions of rights do not impose obligations on citizens) and Randy Barnett, Was the Right to Keep 
and Bear Arms Conditioned on Service in an Organized Militia?, 83 TEX. L. REV. 237, 259 (2004) 
(reviewing H. Richard Uviller & William G. Merkel, THE MILITIA AND THE RIGHT TO ARMS, OR, HOW 
THE SECOND AMENDMENT FELL SILENT (2002)) (finding it hard to accept that the Pennsylvanians 
would have not constitutionalized the individual right of self-defense). Barnett’s error stems from his 
failure to grasp the nature of the English common law context. For a corrective that shows that Heller’s 
individual right is better understood as a traditional English common law right, not a Second Amendment 
claim, see Reva Siegel, Heller and Originalism’s Dead Hand, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1399, 1415 (2009) 
(“[T]here is more evidence in the majority opinion establishing the existence of a common law right of 
self-defense than there is demonstrating that such a right was constitutionalized by the Second 
Amendment’s eighteenth-century ratifiers.”). 
 177.  On the role of debt in Founding era culture, see T.H. BREEN, TOBACCO CULTURE: THE 
MENTALITY OF THE GREAT TIDEWATER PLANTERS ON THE EVE OF REVOLUTION 31–32 (1985); 
WOODY HOLTON, FORCED FOUNDERS: INDIANS, DEBTORS, SLAVES, AND THE MAKING OF THE 
AMERICAN REVOLUTION IN VIRGINIA 61–62 (1999); Emory G. Evans, Planter Indebtedness and the 
Coming of the Revolution in Virginia, 19 WM. & MARY Q. 511 (1962). See also Kevin Sweeney, 
Amendment, supra note 132. 
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privately owned guns from seizure in debt proceedings or sale for failure to pay 
taxes.178 In practical terms, these types of protections were of enormous 
significance. Indeed, during the ratification debate, Anti-Federalists repeatedly 
stressed that the federal government’s power of the purse, particularly onerous 
taxation, was nearly as dangerous as its control of the military. Had legal 
protections for privately owned militia arms not existed, this Anti-Federalist fear 
might have easily come to pass: the state militias might have been disarmed 
without government taking any direct action. Simply by raising taxes, 
government could induce debt-ridden farmers to disarm themselves by selling off 
militia weapons.179 
In the antebellum South two different models of arms bearing emerged and 
each had profound consequences for the scope of government regulation of 
armed travel in public. A more libertarian gun rights tradition exemplified by 
cases such as Bliss, Nunn, and Huntley emerged in parts of the Slave South that 
vindicated a robust right to travel armed in public. Bans on concealed weapons 
were permissible, but only if open carry was available. A different, more 
restricted model also emerged that carried forward a distinctly eighteenth 
century civic republican vision of arms bearing. In Aymette and Buzzard, guns 
related to militia purposes were given full constitutional protection. Other 
weapons were subject to the full authority of the state’s police power.180 
Legal scholarship prior to Heller naturally focused considerable attention on 
antebellum case law, a fact reflected in Justice Scalia’s majority opinion which 
looked to this tradition to understand the scope of Second Amendment rights in 
the decades after its adoption.181 The fact that this jurisprudential tradition was 
unique to the slave South did not spark much scholarly interest at that time and 
accordingly did not receive any judicial notice in Heller. More recent scholarship 
by contrast has been directed by Scalia’s injunction to look more closely at the 
history of regulation for guidance.182 Among the most important discoveries of 
this new body of scholarship is the importance of local and regional variation in 
the regulatory tradition that emerged after the adoption of the Second 
Amendment. This profound localism and regionalism was effectively invisible to 
the Heller court, which erroneously assumed that the Southern tradition 
embodied in the extant case law was representative of broader American legal 
attitudes in the Founding era and early republic. In fact, the Southern libertarian 
 
 178.  Saul Cornell, The Right to Carry Firearms Outside of the Home: Separating Historical Myths 
from Historical Realities, 39 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1695, 1708–09 (2012).  
 179.  See CORNELL, supra note 135 and Sweeney, supra note 132. 
 180.  District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 619–21 (2008).  For two leading late nineteenth 
century commentators who argued that Buzzard, not Bliss was the ascendant paradigm in American law, 
see JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP, COMMENTARIES ON THE CRIMINAL LAW (1868) and John Foster Dillon, 
The Right to Keep and Bear Arms for Public and Private Defense, 1 CENT. L.J. 259 (1874). 
 181.  Heller, 554 U.S. at 610–14.  
 182.  See Joseph Blocher, Firearm Localism, 123 YALE L.J. 82 (2013) and Eric M. Ruben & Saul 
Cornell, Firearm Regionalism and Public Carry: Placing Southern Antebellum Case Law in Context, 125 
YALE L.J. FORUM 121 (2015). 
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tradition of permissive carry was exceptional. Outside of the slave South, a 
different and more restrictive tradition of public carry had emerged.183 
The foundation for this alternative tradition was the version of the Statute of 
Northampton enacted by Massachusetts in 1795. Rather than draw on the text of 
the Parliamentary statute itself, the Massachusetts legislature adopted a gloss 
that had become popular in many of the justice of the peace manuals. 
Massachusetts framed its prohibition on public carry in robust terms:  It outlawed 
anyone who “shall ride or go armed offensively, to the fear or terror of the good 
citizens of this Commonwealth.”184 A New Jersey justice of the peace manual 
published a decade after the Massachusetts statute used the same language 
regarding bans on traveling “armed offensively.”185 The guide elaborated on what 
this prohibition meant, describing the considerable powers enjoyed by peace 
officers to preserve the peace. “So a Justice of the Peace may, in his own 
discretion, require sureties for the peace from one who shall go or ride armed 
offensively to the terror of the people, though they he may not have threatened 
any person in particular, or committed any particular act of violence.”186  As one 
Connecticut justice of the peace manual made clear, it was not simply breaches 
of the peace, but even an “inchoate breach” such as traveling “offensively armed” 
or with “an unusual number of attendants” that ran afoul of the law. In a 
comprehensive overview of the “common law, the statute Laws of Massachusetts, 
and of the United States,” the powers of the justice of the peace to detain and 
arrest those who traveled with offensive weapons, was listed as a separate 
category from such other crimes affray, riot, and disturbing the peace.187 In 1835, 
Massachusetts revised its public carry law. The new Massachusetts statute 
prohibited armed travel, but it recognized an exception in cases where a person 
had a reasonable cause to fear imminent violence.188 
If any person shall go armed with a dirk, dagger, sword, pistol, or other offensive and 
dangerous weapon, without reasonable cause to fear an assault or other injury, or 
violence to his person, or to his family or property, he may on complaint of any person 
having reasonable cause to fear an injury, or breach of the peace, be required to find 
sureties for keeping the peace. . . .189  
  
 
 183.  See Ruben & Cornell, supra note 182. 
 184.  THE PERPETUAL LAWS, OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS, FROM THE 
ESTABLISHMENT OF ITS CONSTITUTION TO THE SECOND SESSION OF THE GENERAL COURT, IN 1798 
259 (Isaiah Thomas ed., 1799).  
 185.  JAMES EWING, A TREATISE ON THE OFFICE AND DUTY OF THE JUSTICE OF THE PEACE, 
SHERIFF, CORONER, CONSTABLE 546 (1805). 
 186.  Id. 
 187.  See JOSEPH BACKUS, THE JUSTICE OF THE PEACE 23–24 (1816). 
 188.  1836 Mass. Acts 750.  
 189.  Id.  
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One of the state’s most distinguished jurists, Peter Oxenbridge Thacher, 
offered this gloss on the new law: 
In our own Commonwealth, no person may go armed with a dirk, dagger, sword, pistol, 
or other offensive and dangerous weapon, without reasonable cause to apprehend an 
assault or violence to his person, family, or property.190 
A contemporary newspaper writer saw the new law in similar terms, using it 
as a jumping off point to explore the scope of the state’s police powers. After 
noting that there was nothing unconstitutional about laws prohibiting the 
discharge of weapons “in cities and populous towns,” the article went on to 
observe that the legislature saw fit to go even further: “have not our legislature 
forbidden, and ought not every legislature” the dangerous practice of traveling 
“armed with pistols, swords, daggers, bowie-knives or other offensive and 
dangerous weapons.”191 The power to prohibit such weapons followed naturally 
from the state’s police power. Indeed, it was an argument “unfounded and 
alarming” to claim that a state had the power to punish crimes, but could do 
nothing to prevent them.192 
In the decades following the adoption of the Massachusetts model of 
restrictive public carry states and localities across the nation used it as a model 
for enacting limits on public carry.193 The constitutionality of such statutes came 
 
 190.  PETER OXENBRIDGE THACHER, TWO CHARGES TO THE GRAND JURY OF THE COUNTY OF 
SUFFOLK, FOR THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS, AT THE OPENING OF THE TERMS OF THE 
MUNICIPAL COURT OF THE CITY OF BOSTON, ON MONDAY, DECEMBER 5TH, A.D. 1836 AND ON 
MONDAY, MARCH 13TH, A.D. 27 (1837); see also Judge Thacher’s Charges, CHRISTIAN REG. & BOS. 
OBSERVER 91 (1837) (excerpting and reprinting the section of the grand jury charge dealing with 
traveling armed). 
 191.  An Address, HAMPSHIRE GAZETTE, Oct. 24, 1838.  
 192.  Id. 
 193.  See 19 DEL. LAWS 733 (1852) (“Any justice of the peace may also cause to be arrested . . . all 
who go armed offensively to the terror of the people, or are otherwise disorderly and dangerous.”); ME. 
REV. STAT. tit. 12 § 16 (1840) (“Any person, going armed with any dirk, dagger, sword, pistol, or other 
offensive and dangerous weapon, without a reasonable cause to fear an assault on himself . . .”); MICH. 
REV. STAT. ch. 162, § 16, reprinted in THE REVISED STATUTES OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN 690, 692 
(1846) (“If any person shall go armed with a dirk, dagger, sword, pistol, or other offensive and dangerous 
weapon, without reasonable cause to fear an assault or other injury, or violence to his person, or to his 
family or property, he may, on complaint of any person having reasonable cause to fear an injury or 
breach of the peace, be required to find sureties for keeping the peace, for a term not exceeding six 
months, with the right of appealing as before provided.”); Of Proceedings to Prevent the Commission of 
Crimes, ch. 14, § 16, 1847 VA. ACTS 127, 129 (“If any person shall go armed with any offensive or 
dangerous weapon, without reasonable cause to fear an assault or other injury, or violence to his person, 
or to his family or property, he may be required to find sureties for keeping the peace for a term not 
exceeding twelve months, with the right of appealing as before provided”); 1870 W. VA. LAWS 702, 703, 
ch. 153, § 8 (“If any person go armed with a deadly or dangerous weapon, without reasonable cause to 
fear violence to his person, family, or property, he may be required to give a recognizance, with the right 
of appeal, as before provided, and like proceedings shall be had on such appeal.”); REVISED STATUTES 
OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE, TO THE YEAR OF OUR LORD ONE THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED AND 
FIFTY-TWO 333 (1852) (“Any justice of the peace may also cause to be arrested . . . all who go armed 
offensively to the terror of the people, or are otherwise disorderly and dangerous.”); THE REVISED CODE 
OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, PREPARED UNDER THE AUTHORITY OF THE ACT OF CONGRESS 
570 (1857) (“If any person shall go armed with a dirk, dagger, sword, pistol, or other offensive and 
dangerous weapon, without reasonable cause to fear an assault or other injury or violence to his 
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before the Texas Supreme Court in English v. State (1872).194 In response to 
widespread violence, including targeted violence against Freedmen, a 
Republican-led Texas legislature enacted a statute based on the 1835 
Massachusetts model.195 The Republican-controlled Texas Supreme Court 
upheld the law, noting that such laws were “not peculiar to our own State,” but 
had become common: “It is safe to say that almost, if not every one of the States 
of this union have a similar law upon their statute books, and, indeed, so far as 
we have been able to examine them, they are more rigorous than the act under 
consideration.”196  Although the Texas arms-bearing provision recognized a right 
to regulate the scope of the right, the court did not think the power the legislature 
had exercised extraordinary, but rather saw it as a basic exercise of the state’s 
police powers.197 “The powers of government are intended to operate upon the 
civil conduct of the citizen; and whenever his conduct becomes such as to offend 
against public morals or public decency, it comes within the range of legislative 
authority.”198 Two years later, a new court dominated by Democrats opposed to 
Reconstruction took up a series of cases on the right to carry.199 In contrast to the 
earlier court composed of Republicans, the new Democrat-dominated court took 
a more expansive view of the right to bear arms, one close in spirit to Heller’s 
individual rights model.  One point of commonality between the courts was the 
 
person . . . .”); THE REVISED STATUTES OF THE STATE OF WISCONSIN: PASSED AT THE ANNUAL 
SESSION OF THE LEGISLATURE COMMENCING JANUARY 13, 1858, AND APPROVED MAY 17, 1858 985 
(1858) (“If any person shall go armed with a dirk, dagger, sword, pistol or pistols, or other offensive and 
dangerous weapon, without reasonable cause to fear an assault or other injury or violence to his 
person . . . .”); THE STATUTES OF OREGON: ENACTED AND CONTINUED IN FORCE BY THE 
LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY, AT THE SESSION COMMENCING 5TH DECEMBER, 1853 220 (1854) (“If any 
person shall go armed with dirk, dagger, sword, pistol, or other offensive and dangerous weapon, without 
reasonable cause to fear an assault, injury, or other violence to his person, or to his family or property, 
he may, on complaint of any other person, having reasonable cause to fear an injury, or breach of the 
peace, be required to find sureties for keeping the peace for a term not exceeding six months, with the 
right of appealing as before provided.”); JOHN PURDON, A DIGEST OF THE LAWS OF PENNSYLVANIA, 
FROM THE YEAR ONE THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED TO THE TWENTY-FIRST DAY OF MAY, ONE 
THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED AND SIXTY-ONE 250 (9th ed. 1862) (“If any person, not being an officer 
on duty in the military or naval service of the state or of the United States, shall go armed with a dirk, 
dagger, sword or pistol, or other offensive or dangerous weapon, without reasonable cause to fear an 
assault or other injury or violence . . . .”); GEORGE B. YOUNG, THE GENERAL STATUTES OF THE STATE 
OF MINNESOTA, AS AMENDED BY SUBSEQUENT LEGISLATION, WITH WHICH ARE INCORPORATED 
ALL GENERAL LAWS OF THE STATE IN FORCE AT THE CLOSE OF THE LEGISLATIVE SESSION OF 1878 
629 (1879) (“Whoever goes armed with a dirk, dagger, sword, pistol or pistols, or other offensive and 
dangerous weapons, without reasonable cause to fear an assault or other injury or violence to his 
person . . . .”). 
 194. English v. State, 35 Tex. 473 (1871).  
 195. Mark Anthony Frassetto, The Law and Politics of Firearms Regulation in Reconstruction Texas 
4 TEX. A&M L. REV. (forthcoming), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers2.cfm?abstract_id=2810806, 
[https://perma.cc/MDM8-MAJG] (analyzing Republican and Democratic views of gun regulation in 
Reconstruction era Texas).  
 196.  Id.  
 197.  TEX. CONST. of 1869, art. I § 13 (“Every person shall have the right to keep and bear arms, in 
the lawful defense of himself or the State, under such regulations as the Legislature may prescribe.”). 
 198.  English, 35 Tex. 473. 
 199.  See Frasetto, supra note 195.  
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view that as long as the law allowed for a self-defense exception for cases of 
imminent threat, the prohibition on public carry was legal.200 
Finally, even more sweeping bans on public carry were enacted in parts of the 
West. In some instances such laws were enacted at the state level and in other 
cases local communities passed ordinances limiting public carry.201 Thus, by the 
end of the nineteenth century there were multiple models for dealing with the 
issue of public carry. The permissive Southern model developed in the 
antebellum slave South did not have much appeal to Americans in the post- Civil 
War era. 
Additional evidence that America had not embraced the permissive Southern 
model may be found in a comprehensive overview of the laws pertaining to public 
carry published in The American and English Encyclopedia of Law, an influential 
and popular legal reference work published at the end of the nineteenth 
century.202 The Encyclopedia includes a detailed entry on the laws covering 
carrying firearms in public. It noted that “[t]he statutes of some of the States have 
made it an offence to carry weapons concealed about the body, while others 
prohibit the simple carrying of weapons, whether they are concealed or not. Such 
statutes have been held not to conflict with the constitutional right of the people 
of the United States to keep and bear arms.”203 The contributors explained that 
American law recognized both a permissive and restrictive approach to carry. 
   The repeated claim made by gun rights advocates and others that there was 
a widely recognized right of open carry in the nineteenth century is demonstrably 
false. To the extent that such a right did exist it reflected a regional, not a national 
 
 200.  See State v. Duke, 42 Tex. 455 (1874). 
 201.  On restrictions in the “wild west,” see Dodge City, Kan., Ordinance No. 16, § XI (Sept. 22, 1876) 
and 1876 WYO. COMP. LAWS 52, § 1 (prohibiting anyone from “bear[ing] upon his person, concealed or 
openly, any fire arm or other deadly weapon, within the limits of any city, town or village.”) For robust 
local laws, see Ordinances of the Council of the City of Dallas and Annual Reports of City Officers from 
October 1st, 1886 to June 25th, 1888 (that if any person in the City of Dallas shall carry on or about his 
person, saddle, or in his saddle-bags, any pistol, dirk, dagger, slungshot, sword- cane, spear, or knuckles 
made of any metal or hard substance, bowie knife, or any other kind of knife manufactured or sold for 
purposes of offense or defense, he shall be punished by fine of not less than twenty-five nor more than 
two hundred dollars and shall be confined in the city prison not less than twenty nor more than sixty 
days.). THEODORE HARRIS, CHARTER AND ORDINANCES OF THE CITY OF SAN ANTONIO COMPRISING 
ALL ORDINANCES OF A GENERAL CHARACTER IN FORCE AUGUST 7TH, 1899 (“If any person, within 
the corporate limits of the city of San Antonio, shall carry on or about his or her person, saddle, or in his 
saddle bags, any pistol, dirk, dagger, sling shot, sword cane, spear, or knuckles made of any metal or any 
hard substance, bowie knife, or any other kind of knife manufactured or sold for purposes of offense or 
defense, he or she shall be punished by a fine of not less than twenty-five dollars ($25.00) nor more than 
two hundred dollars ($200.00).”). Pueblo Colorado, Ordinances, Section Six, art. II, ch. 8 (“ If any person 
other than a law officer  shall carry upon his person any loaded pistol, or other deadly weapon, he shall 
upon conviction be fined not less than fifteen nor more than fifty dollars for each offense, and in addition 
thereto forfeit to the city any weapon found on his person.”)  
 202.  Review American and English Encyclopedia of Law, 29 CENTRAL L.J. 400 (1896). 
 203.  THE AMERICAN AND ENGLISH ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW 408 (1887). It addressed both relevant 
state case law and noted that the Second Amendment had not been incorporated. For the rejection of 
Second Amendment incorporation in the nineteenth century, see United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 
542 (1875). In McDonald v. City of Chicago, the Second Amendment was held to apply to the states. 
McDonald v. Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010). 
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norm. Similarly, the notion that states are prohibited from requiring a reason to 
travel armed is also historically false. Many states followed Massachusetts and 
restricted such a right to situations in which individuals had a reasonable fear of 
imminent threat. If one follows Heller’s rule and looks at the historical record in 
an impartial and scholarly manner, the gun rights mythology about the right to 
carry turns out to reflect a partial account of the historical record. As the detailed 
treatment of this issue in the American and English Encyclopedia of Law makes 
clear, the notion of limiting public carry was an uncontroversial proposition at 
the end of the nineteenth century.204 
IX 
CONCLUSION 
A systematic survey of popular guides to the law aimed at justices of the 
peace, constables, and other peace officers provides an excellent set of sources 
for exploring how the concepts of self-defense, the right to keep or travel with 
arms, and the need to balance these claims against the preservation of the peace 
evolved in the more than two centuries following the Glorious Revolution.  
Scholarship written before Heller offered a static and flawed account of the scope 
of the English right to keep and travel with arms. The actual history of this pre-
existing English right and its evolution under American law is both fascinating 
and far more complex than either side in the modern debate over gun rights or 
gun violence prevention have realized. In parts of the American South, a more 
expansive conception of the right to travel armed emerged. Outside of the South, 
a more restrictive attitude toward armed travel took hold. By the end of the 
nineteenth century the more restrictive model was ascendant, but traces of the 
Southern model continued to exist. 
The dispute between Justice Scalia and Justice Breyer over balancing may 
have been misplaced. The notion that the right of self-defense had to be balanced 
against the necessity to keep the peace was central to the way the common law 
dealt with arms. Preserving liberty while protecting the peace is not some modern 
imposition sprung from the head of modern activist jurists. It is the fundamental 
guiding principle at the root of Anglo-American law in this area and has always 
defined the way legislators, justices of the peace, and judges approach the 
regulation of arms.  Perhaps the least appreciated part of the text of the Second 
Amendment is the clause that asserts the goal of promoting the “security of a free 
state.” Policies that undermine that security are clearly not consistent with the 
Amendment’s purpose. A variety of regulations on the right to keep and bear 
arms are not only permissible, but are in some sense essential to harmonize the 
two parts of the Amendment. The long history of common law restrictions only 
underscore this basic point. 
 
 
 204.  See Kopel supra note 111;  O’Shea, supra note 155; Volokh, supra note 20.  
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